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ABSTRACT
Tracing is a method that appears within multiple fields of law.
Distinct conceptions of tracing, however, have arisen independently
within securities and remedial law. In the securities context plaintiffs
must “trace” their securities to a specific offering to pursue certain
relief under the Securities Act of 1933. In the remedial context victims
who “trace” their misappropriated value into a wrongdoer’s hands can
claim any derivative value, even if it has appreciated.
This article is the first to compare and then cross-apply tracing
within these two contexts. Specifically, this article argues that securities
law should adopt a version of the “rules-based tracing” method from
remedial law. This method’s tracing of exchanged value, instead of
purchased securities, will restore broad access to private civil remedies
and the optimal level of deterrence for fraudulent public offerings.
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INTRODUCTION
As part of a broader initiative integrating statutory disclosure
requirements,1 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
proposed an “access equals delivery” model for prospectuses.2 The
model would relieve certain issuers of their existing obligations to print
and deliver a final prospectus to investors prior to or contemporaneous
with the sale of a security;3 such issuers merely would have to file the
final prospectus with a timely registration statement.4 This streamlined
requirement presumes that investors have access to any filings available
on the internet.5 Accordingly, posting filings on a website would
constructively effect delivery.
There are consequences to subsuming delivery obligations within the
rubric of presumed access. On the one hand, the “access equals
delivery” regime would eliminate simultaneous delivery of the final
1
See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. 67392, 67393 & n.15 (proposed
Nov. 17, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243, and 274)
(“The 1998 proposals [that unsuccessfully attempted to modernize the securities offering
process] were a step in an evaluation of the offering process under the Securities Act [of
1933] that began as far back as 1966 . . . .”) (referencing The Regulation of Securities
Offerings, 63 Fed. Reg. 67174 (proposed Dec. 4, 1998), and citing Milton H. Cohen,
“Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1342 (1966) (“[I]t is my plea
that there now be created a new coordinated disclosure system having as its basis the
continuous disclosure system of the 1934 Act and treating the ‘1933 Act’ disclosure
needs on this foundation.”)).
2
See Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. at 67438-41. The SEC first proposed
a version of this model in 2000. See Use of Electronic Media, 17 C.F.R. §§ 231, 241,
271 (May 4, 2000); see also infra note 5.
3
These relaxed obligations would be available only to “well-known seasoned
issuers,” and their majority-owned subsidiaries, that must have at least $700 million of
outstanding common equity or $1 billion of registered debt securities. Securities Offering
Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. at 67396 (A “well-known seasoned issuer” is characterized by
“having more regular dialogue with investors and market participants through the press
and other media” as well as its communications being “subject to scrutiny by investors,
the financial press, and others who evaluate disclosure when it is made.”).
4
Id. at 67438-39.
5
Id. at 67438 (“Under an ‘access equals delivery’ model, investors are presumed to
have access to the Internet . . . . The access concept is premised on the information or
filings being readily available.”). One immediate concern with this presumption is that a
sizable segment of the public still do not have access to the internet. See, e.g., Spencer
Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 73, 110 (2004) (“Currently, nearly one-quarter of Americans remain
‘offline.’”). Indeed, the SEC cited this lack of access as a reason as recently as 2000 for
withdrawing an earlier version of “access equals delivery.” See, e.g., Michael A. Perino,
Securities Law for the Next Millennium: A Forward-Looking Statement, 75 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1, 5 n.17 (2001) (“The SEC concluded that such an ‘access-equals-delivery’ model
was inappropriate at this time because of concerns that electronic media was not
‘universally accessible and accepted’ by investors.”) (quoting Use of Electronic Media,
Exchange Act Release No. 42727, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
86,304, at 83,388, 83,390 (Apr. 28, 2000)). This is not to say that such individuals do not
have internet access through public libraries or institutional investment opportunities that
do fit the presumption of access. For a more detailed analysis of this presumption of
access, see, for example, Anita Indira Anand, The Efficiency of Direct Public Offerings, 7
J. SMALL & EMERG. BUS. L. 433, 438-54 (2003).
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prospectus and a confirmation of sale,6 arguably clarifying the function
of a confirmation and expediting sales of some securities. On the other
hand, delivery of the final prospectus after the sale of a security reassures
investors that their purchase is part of a registered transaction in a way
that presumed access cannot.7
Recognizing the value of such
reassurance, the SEC has proposed a rule requiring parties effecting sale
of a security to send investors a notification, instead of a final prospectus,
confirming that the transaction is connected to a registration statement.8
Providing reassurance, however, was not the original rationale for
the proposed notification provision. In unveiling its “access equals
delivery” model the SEC announced: “[T]o preserve an investor’s
ability to trace securities to a registered offering, the proposals include a
separate requirement to notify investors that they purchased securities in
a registered offering.”9
Inexplicably, the SEC’s actual proposal
completely omits any such concern over the tracing of securities. This is
particularly curious considering that the notification provision has
undergone no apparent revision from its inception.10
Yet the omission is hardly surprising in that the ability of investors to
trace securities has been eroding over time. The Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) strives to protect investors by providing private civil
remedies that deter fraudulent offerings and sales of securities.11 To
access these remedies, courts require proof that purchased securities were
6

Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. at 67438 (“Because the contract of sale
has already occurred, we . . . believe that delivery of a confirmation and the delivery of
the final prospectus need not be linked.”).
7
See, e.g., id. at 67349 (“[P]rospectus delivery can serve the function of informing
investors that they purchased securities in a registered transaction.”).
8
Id. Investors still would be able to request a final prospectus, but issuers would not
have to deliver it prior to settlement of the purchase. Id.; see also infra Part I.B.
9
Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Securities
Offering Reform, Requires Registration of Hedge Fund Investment Advisers (Oct. 27,
2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/pres/2004-150.htm; see
also Commission Announcements, SEC News Digest (Oct. 27, 2004) (same), available
at http://ww.sec.gov/news/digest/dig102704.txt.
10
Despite the comprehensive and significant nature of the SEC’s “access equals
delivery” proposal, there was no Concept Release.
11
See, e.g., Edward N. Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C.-The
Government View, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 6, 9 (1959) (“The two principal objectives of
the 1933 act were, first, to protect investors by requiring adequate and accurate disclosure
regarding securities distributed to the public in interstate commerce or by use of the mail,
and, second, to outlaw fraud in the sale of all securities whether or not newly issued.”);
see also infra note 85 and accompanying text. This article is concerned only with private
civil remedies under the Securities Act because they are exclusively subject to the tracing
requirement. Some courts and commentators have pointed plaintiffs unable to satisfy the
tracing requirement to Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act. See, e.g., Paul C.
Curnin & Christine M. Ford, The Critical Issue of Standing Under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 155, 156 (2001). This is a red
herring. Rule 10b-5 imposes a stiffer scienter requirement and targets different
defendants than sections 11 or 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j et
seq. (2004), with 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-l et seq. (2004). Pointing to Rule 10b-5 fails to
engage the tracing requirement and its thwarting of access to the Securities Act’s private
civil remedies.
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issued in connection with an oral communication, prospectus, or
registration statement containing a material misstatement or omission,
that is, plaintiffs must “trace” their securities back to a fraudulent public
offering.12 Courts originally applied this tracing requirement only to
section 11 of the Securities Act,13 which imposes strict liability on
offerors and sellers directly involved in a fraudulent registered
transaction.14 Courts have proceeded to extend the tracing requirement to
section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act,15 which imposes a negligence
standard on offerors and sellers that prepare oral communications or
prospectuses in a fraudulent registered transaction.16 Utilizing an
aggressive interpretation of the Supreme Court’s heavily criticized
decision in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,17 courts subsequently have applied
the tracing requirement to limit section 12(a)(2)’s recissionary remedy to
only public offerings.18 As aptly summarized by Hillary Sale, the net
effect of these judicial interpretations is that the Securities Act’s private
civil remedies have been “Disappearing Without A Trace.”19

12
Tracing of securities is alternatively framed as a question of “standing.” See, e.g.,
Demaria v. Anderson, 318 F.3d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Aftermarket purchasers who
can trace their shares to an allegedly misleading registration statement have standing to
sue under . . . the 1933 Act.”); Curnin & Ford, supra note 11, at 156 (“[A] plaintiff has
standing even if his or her shares are purchased in the secondary market within a certain
number of days after the offering, or are otherwise ‘traceable’ to the offering.”). This
conflates distinct terms. Tracing concerns the factual viability of certain causes of action
under the Securities Act, whereas standing concerns the procedural propriety of certain
shareholders bringing a cause of action under the Securities Act. Accordingly, a plaintiff
may raise the question of standing at any point in litigation, whereas tracing is a merits
issue that must await trial. See, e.g., In re Lilco Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 663, 671
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[T]racing is a question of fact reserved for trial.”). Certainly standing
is a threshold requirement in that prospective plaintiffs that lack standing will not be
subject to the tracing requirement; this perhaps explains why tracing is often collapsed
into an inquiry about standing. Plaintiffs with standing, however, still might not be able
to satisfy the tracing requirement. See infra notes 232-235 and accompanying text.
Moreover, reframing tracing as a question of standing invokes a vast body of
literature fraught with problems of no immediate relevance here. See, e.g., Nancy C.
Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 613-14 (2004) (“[V]irtually every
published article on the topic seems to argue that the law of standing is at best confusing
and at worst a serious impediment to fair and just outcomes. The doctrine, it is charged,
is ‘permeated with sophistry,’ a ‘tool to further [judges’] ideological agendas,’ wildly
vacillating,’ and ‘a large-scale conceptual mistake.”) (quoting 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:35, at 342 (2d ed. 1983)). As this article
demonstrates, tracing within securities law is actually a misnomer for a distinct process
known as “following,” a purely mechanical exercise of locating misappropriated
property. See infra Part II.B. Accordingly, this article does not use the term “standing.”
13
See, e.g., Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967); see also infra Part I.C.
14
15 U.S.C. § 77k (2004); see also infra Part I.A.
15
See, e.g., In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); see
also infra Part I.C.
16
15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2004); see also infra Part I.A.
17
513 U.S. 561 (1995); see also infra note 118.
18
Regrettably, Congress has codified Gustafson through the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
19
Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without A Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the
1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2000).
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This disappearance is the by-product of securities history and
practice. During the late 1960s the system for processing securities
trades completely collapsed during the “Paper Crunch.”20 In what the
SEC described as “the most prolonged and severe crisis in the securities
industry in forty years,”21 brokerage firms had become inundated with
paper stock certificates that had to be altered, recorded, and then
physically delivered to issuers for each and every trade.22 Congress
responded by directing the SEC to implement an electronically-based
“book-entry system,” which now registers securities in the name of a
third party nominee, or a “street name.”23 The use of street names has
erased from securities any vestige that they belong to a specific
purchaser or come from a particular offering. Combined with the
creation of centralized repositories,24 the book-entry system has
transformed securities into fungible instruments.25
An unintended casualty of this transformation has been the capacity
of all securityholders to satisfy the tracing requirement. Securityholders
must trace all of their purchases to a specific fraudulent offering. This is
because courts consistently have found anything less to be wanting,26
even a showing that 97% of all securities were from a fraudulent
offering.27 When there is only one offering of securities, a simple
inference connects all purchases to any fraud.28 But when there are
multiple offerings,29 the tracing requirement “draws arbitrary distinctions
20

See infra Part I.B.
STUDY OF SAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (PURSUANT TO
SECTION 11(h) OF THE SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 1970) 1, H.R. Doc. No.
92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1971) [hereinafter SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND
PRACTICES]. See also infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
23
See, e.g., Egon Guttman, Toward the Uncertificated Security: A Congressional
Lead for States to Follow, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717, 718 (1980) (“Recordation of
securities in the name of a registered broker/dealer or in that of a national bank or their
respective nominees is called registration in ‘street name.’”). See also Prefatory Note,
UCC Rev. Art. 8, at 4 (2000) (“[O]ne entity-Cede & Co.-is listed as the shareholder of
record of somewhere in the range of sixty to eighty percent of the outstanding shares of
all publicly traded companies.”).
24
The Depository Trust Company (DTC) is the nation’s largest repository for
publicly traded securities. See, e.g., Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 4 (“Essentially all
of the trading in publicly held companies is executed through the broker-dealers who are
participants in DTC . . . .”). See also infra notes 103, 108, and accompanying text.
25
See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
26
See, e.g., Krim v. pcOrder.com, 210 F.R.D. 581, 586 (W.D. Tex. 2002)
(“[D]amages [must] actually [be] issued pursuant to a defective statement, not just that it
might have been, probably was, or most likely was, issued pursuant to a defective
statement.”).
27
See In re Quarterdeck Office Sys. Sec. Litig., No. CV 92-3970, 1993 WL 623310,
at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1993).
28
In re: Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., Nos. 21 MC 92, 01 Civ. 3857, 01 Civ.
8408, 01 Civ. 7048, 01 Civ. 9417, 01 Civ. 6001, 01 Civ. 0242, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004).
29
This includes shelf-registered securities, although there is arguably a decreased
need to protect participants in such offerings. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory
21
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between plaintiffs based on the remote genesis of their shares.”30 Only
parties that purchase securities before they flow through the book-entry
system have any assurance of tracing successfully; this is a “narrow class
of persons,”31 which includes “institutional investors, members of
Congress, and those with connections to underwriters.”32 Everyone else
who purchases securities in the aftermarket must try to trace fungible
securities registered in street name back to a specific fraudulent
offering.33 As one court has conceded:
The modern practice of electronic delivery and clearing
of securities trades, which all deposited shares of the
same issue are held together in fungible bulk, makes it
virtually impossible to trace shares to a registration
statement once additional unregistered shares have
entered the market.34
Indeed, a commentator recently found only five instances where
securityholders were even “possibly able to meet the direct-tracing
requirement.”35
The reason is that tracing creates a perverse incentive to conduct
multiple offerings. Provided only one of the offerings does not involve
fraud, aftermarket purchasers have little, if any, chance of tracing
fungible securities successfully. In this way conducting multiple
offerings can utilize the tracing requirement to evade or undo liability
under sections 11 or 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. As Melvyn Weiss, a
prominent shareholder advocate, “bitterly” has accused one court:
Weiss: “[Y]ou are giving them an incentive to avoid
section 11 liability.”
Court: “What do I do about the case law, which
according to the defense, whether it’s one percent or less
than one percent [of non-fraudulent securities], once that
problem occurs, the cases, they . . . uniformly say it’s
over.”36
The court proceeded to say just that, finding the securities untraceable
while discreetly noting that “it is not the domain of this Court to
Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L.
REV. 135, 176-84 (1984).
30
In re: IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *37.
31
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951); see also
Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1967).
32
Sale, supra note 19, at 441. This class includes persons fortunate enough to
receive “spun” stock. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A
Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public
Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583 (2004); Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023 (2002).
See also infra note 122 and accompanying text.
33
See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
34
In re: IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38 (emphasis added).
35
Sale, supra note 19, at 463.
36
In re: IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38 n.402. The court more tactfully observed
that Weiss had “noted bitterly the possible unfairness of this standard.” Id.
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abrogate” the tracing requirement.37 The intent of Congress, however,
could not be any clearer: to deter fraudulent offerings through the
Securities Act’s private civil remedies.38 This is where the true
abrogation has occurred. By strictly applying the tracing requirement,
courts have thwarted equal and meaningful access to sections 11 and
12(a)(2), and undermined their deterrence effect.
Ironically, the tracing requirement is unsatisfactory regardless of
one’s view towards these provisions. Scholars that favor expanded
access to private civil remedies have observed that “[w]hat began . . . as
a shield to prevent non-Offering Shareholders from proceeding with
section 11 claims has become a sword in the hands of defendants . . . .”39
Yet practitioners that support restricted access to these remedies have
contended that the “confusion and uncertainty engendered by a broad
interpretation of ‘tracing’ is an anathema to a coherent and predictable
federal securities regulatory scheme.”40
Securities law, however, misunderstands what remedial law already
knows. Tracing originated as a remedial method.41 Though its definition
is far from settled,42 tracing refers to a process of determining when, “for
certain legal purposes, one asset stands in the place of another.”43
Tracing in this context enables a victim to seek a claim forcing a
wrongdoer to disgorge all proceeds derived from misappropriated
value;44 tracing thus embodies the ancient maxim omnia praesumuntur
contract apoliatorem, or everything is presumed against a thief.45 In the
parlance of criminal procedure tracing regards the wrongdoer’s value as
ill-gotten fruit from a poisonous tree.
The justification for remedial tracing lies at the core of restitution. In
a conventional sense restitution provides relief from unjust enrichment,
when a party has received a legally unjustifiable benefit at another
party’s expense.46 There is also a literal sense known as “specific
37

Id.
See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
39
Sale, supra note 19, at 463-64.
40
Curnin & Ford, supra note 11, at 203.
41
See infra Part II.A.
42
See infra Parts II.A-B.
43
LIONEL D. SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING 3 (1997). Dale Oesterle defines tracing
conventionally as a “restitutionary right to claim specific property . . . that arises from a
property interest of the claimant in other property that another has misappropriated.”
Dale A. Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated
Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 172, 173 (1983). This
definition is premised on certain distinctions that are rebutted by or subsumed within the
notion of rules-based tracing that I use here, see infra Part II.B., and that is a form of
corrective justice, see generally Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of
Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138 (1999); Lionel Smith, Restitution: The Heart
of Corrective Justice, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2115 (2001).
44
Remedial tracing typically focuses on assets or property, in the way courts focus
on tracing securities. I embrace a conception of tracing that instead focuses on value, a
more principled basis for establishing legal claims. See infra Parts II.B. & III.A.
45
PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 368 (1989).
46
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 1, at 12 (1937) (“A person who has been unjustly enriched at
38
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restitution,” which involves “restoration in something lost or taken
away.”47 These dual senses of restitution are captured in a theory known
as “rules-based tracing,”48 which draws a parallel distinction between
tracing and “following.” The latter is an exercise that attempts to
identify and locate only the value of what has been misappropriated
from a party;49 although the exercise is exclusively factual, and so does
not generate any legal liability, successful following enables a party to
seek a specific restitution claim. In contrast tracing is a process that
attempts to determine whether certain value a wrongdoer possesses is a
substitute for original value misappropriated from a party;50 although the
process also does not generate any legal liability, successful tracing
enables a party to seek an unjust enrichment claim. In this way tracing
represents a powerful tool to impose on the wrongdoer the costs of
misappropriation, and reallocate its benefits to the victim ex post. Dale
Oesterle has observed that “the primary limitation on the scope of the
right to trace is the ignorance of lawyers as to its availability.”51
Securities law suffers from not only an ignorance, but also an
impoverished conception, of tracing proper. At best, the current tracing
requirement is simply a form of rules-based following.52 Courts
predicate access to private civil relief under the Securities Act upon a
showing that plaintiffs can identify and locate their purchased security
within a specific fraudulent offering. But while the security is the object
of this exercise, this is not what the Securities Act’s remedial provisions
actually restore, which is monetary relief.53 The current tracing
requirement, then, is not even a form of specific restitution. Nor is the
requirement a form of unjust enrichment. Requiring securityholders to
demonstrate a link between their purchase and a specific fraudulent
offering involves no component of inequitable gain or loss, much less
any disgorgement of substituted value.
On the contrary, most
securityholders cannot satisfy the current tracing requirement precisely
because their purchase is commingled with other like securities
registered in street name from multiple offerings.54 Securities law,
therefore, applies a conception of tracing that ironically frustrates, rather
than relieves, victims of fraudulent offerings.
the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.”) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION]; id. at 1 (“The Restatement of this Subject deals with
situations in which one person is accountable to another on the ground that otherwise he
would unjustly benefit or the other would unjustly suffer loss.”) (General Scope Note).
47
Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV.
1277, 1279 (1989); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 372
(1981) (providing for specific restitution at law and in equity) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS]; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 4, cmt. c (providing for
specific restitution at law); infra Part II.A.
48
See infra Part II.B.
49
See infra notes 182, 186, and accompanying text.
50
See infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text.
51
Oesterle, supra note 43, at 180.
52
See infra Part III.A.
53
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77l(2) (2004).
54
See infra Part III.B.
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This article proposes a novel way to reconceptualize tracing of
securities culled from its remedial relative, rules-based tracing. Part I
examines tracing within securities law. Specifically, Part I demonstrates
how the book-entry system has combined with the judicially-created
tracing requirement to restrict access to private civil remedies under the
Securities Act and undermine its ability to deter fraud. Part II shifts to
tracing within remedial law. Specifically, Part II analyzes inadequacies
with various approaches to tracing assets and property, and delineates
how rules-based tracing’s focus on value can resolve the problems
presented by commingled fungible assets. Part III then reconciles
securities and remedial tracing. The critical move is to reorient securities
law towards substituted value, the money exchanged for securities.55
This method of tracing can solve the problems presented by multiple
offerings with the aid of a simple designation system. At the point of
purchase securityholders need only select an offering that will be used
for making claims under section 11 or 12(a)(2). Permitting these
selections is consistent with the Securities Act’s antifraud provisions and
with the recently proposed “access equals disclosure” model. Most
importantly, by tracing money instead of securities, courts can restore all
securityholders’ access to private civil remedies and optimal deterrence
against fraudulent offerings.
METHODOLOGY
This article is an application of “intradisciplinarity,”56 a method that
“transfers theories, practices, and technologies across legal domains.”57
Intradisciplinarity recognizes that the law is conventionally organized
around certain categorical distinctions, such as the theoretical divide
between the private and public,58 or the curricular compartmentalizing of
civil procedure, contracts, criminal law, property, and torts.59 A byproduct of these distinctions is that legal doctrines can arise in different
domains of the law and develop in dissimilar or inconsistent ways.

55
Cf. ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Warner Bros. 1976) (“I have to do this my way.
You tell me what you know, and I’ll confirm. I’ll keep you in the right direction if I can,
but that’s all. Just . . . follow the money.”) (Hal Holbrook aka Deep Throat).
56
Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholders and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119,
152 (2003).
57
Id. Anupam Chander perspicuously observes that “intradisciplinarity seems
especially appropriate to law, a discipline that relies on analogical reasoning.” Id. I
agree with his implicit point that intradisciplinarity is neither necessarily nor advisedly
restricted to law.
58
See, e.g., Symposium, Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289
(1982); Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American
Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225 (1985).
59
See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Path Not Taken, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1044, 1045
(1997) (noting, “in reciprocal disdain, torts courses ignore the policy objectives of
adjacent fields like contracts, civil procedure, criminal law, and property,” a “path of
increasing social irrelevance and irresponsibility” that departs from Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s prescription of the “rational study of law”).
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Intradisciplinarity critically examines these dissimilarities and
inconsistencies. The method juxtaposes and compares concurrent
conceptions of a legal doctrine or method, eliciting structural and
substantive parallels. These parallels then serve as a basis for crossfertilization, utilizing one domain’s conception to inform our
understanding and application of another. In this way intradisciplinarity
facilitates dialogue between legal domains, and thereby challenges the
artificiality of certain categorical barriers within the law.
Intradisciplinarity has a distinguished lineage.60 The method has
connected seemingly disparate domains such as contract and tort law,61
tort and criminal law,62 criminal and corporate law,63 as well as corporate
and evidentiary law.64 And a recent movement revitalizing the method
appears to be afoot in corporate circles.65 Cynics might dismiss the
60
Within legal discourse the method can be traced back to Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972), which furnished a principled way to integrate
property and tort law. Commentators have extended the method to areas such as criminal
and contract law. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. And intradisciplinarity
is naturally suited for quasi-meta-subjects, such as constitutional, intellectual property,
and international law, that encompass a broad range of legal fields. See, e.g., BRUCE
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); F. Scott Kieff & Troy A.
Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 174 (2004) (distilling principles of antitrust, contract, and property law within the
framework of intellectual property law); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law
and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship,
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 372 (1998) (observing a “lively intradisciplinary debate” within
international law about the relationship between comparative politics and constitutional
law). I see no reason why intradisciplinarity cannot be extended to meta-subjects, such as
civil and criminal procedure, conflicts of law, evidence, and, obviously, remedies. See,
e.g., David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving
Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO.
L.J. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=706601.
61
See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1980)
(connecting compensation systems within criminal, insurance, labor, and tort law);
GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT (1976) (arguing that contracts law is being
reabsorbed into the mainstream of tort law). But see, e.g., Jeffrey O’Connell, The
Interlocking Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1977)
(suggesting a way to segregate problems associated with characterizing problems as one
of contract or torts).
62
See, e.g., Symposium, The Intersection of Tort and Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 1 (1996). See also Richard A. Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in New Bottles,
in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231
(Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977).
63
See, e.g., LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND
KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW (1996); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information:
Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992);
Arthur L. Goodhard, Blackmail and Consideration in Contracts, 44 L.Q. REV. 436
(1928).
64
See, e.g., Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735 (2004) (reconciling
corporate and evidentiary gatekeeping).
65
See generally Chander, supra note 56 (reconciling the notion of “minorities”
within constitutional and corporate law); Stephen Choi & Jill Fisch, How to Fix Wall
Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269
(2003) (grafting the notion of vouchers from school and campaign finance schemes to
certain private intermediaries); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of
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method as a simple pursuit of consistent approaches among legal
domains.66 With all due respect to Ralph Waldo Emerson,67 this article
endeavors to demonstrate that intradisciplinarity is not foolishly
concerned with its own shadow, but instead has much to do with tracing
in particular and corporate law in general.
I. TRACING SECURITIES
The express purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors. In
this vein sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act provide private
civil remedies for material misstatements or omissions in connection
with a public offering of securities. Access to these remedies, however,
was compromised by the infamous Paper Crunch of the late 1960s, in
which the system for processing securities trades first collapsed and then
overhauled itself; the resulting book-entry system created a centralized
system where fungible securities are now registered in the name of a
third party intermediary, and not the actual purchaser.
Severing this link between purchasers and securities has
inadvertently transformed the judicially-created tracing requirement.
Courts require plaintiffs seeking relief under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of
the Securities to prove that their purchased securities actually were part
of a fraudulent public offering. Tracing securities is thus an evidentiary
standard, requiring securityholders to prove factual causation between
the alleged fraud in a specific offering and a purchase of securities.
Not all securityholders are alike, however, in the eyes of securities
tracing. When there are multiple offerings, courts apply a conception of
tracing that can be satisfied by only a select group of purchasers with
Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267 (2004)
drawing parallels between Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2001 as a response to recent financial
scandals, and USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, as a response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001); Thomas W. Joo, Race, Contract, Property, and the Role of
Metaphor in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779 (2002) (examining within
corporate law the contractarian metaphor, based on consent and enforceability, and the
property metaphor, based on rights and duties); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate
Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565 (2003) (comparing corporate and
trust instruments in relation to capital markets).
66
This objection is formally expressed by the Fallacy of the Transplanted Category.
See Moffatt Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CAN. B. REV. 535, 547
(1959) (“When a legal category . . . is imported into a different context where a different
legal result (involving different legal policies) is in issue, the transplanted category may
well suggest a result which frustrates the relevant policies which should control the
determination of the new issue.”). Cf. Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1058 (1996) (examining the problem of structural inconsistency,
“[t]he theoretical antithesis of . . . the so-called fallacy of the transplanted category”).
67
See Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITS 66
(C.W. Eliot ed., 1909) (“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by
little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply
nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall.”). But cf.
Christoph Engel, Inconsistency in the Law: In Search of a Balanced Norm (Dec. 2004)
(contending that consistency in legal rules has limited consequential value), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=628387.
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direct access to a fraudulent offering. Because of the book-entry system,
aftermarket purchasers receive fungible securities registered in street
name, and cannot trace them reliably back to a specific offering. As a
result, the judicial tracing requirement currently operates to eviscerate
private civil remedies for a broad set of securityholders, and thereby
undercut the Securities Act’s ability to deter fraudulent public offerings.
This Part establishes the troubled application of tracing within the
securities context. Opponents and proponents of securities tracing both
ground their arguments in the Securities Act’ intent and provisions.
Accordingly, the first step is to examine the statutory relief afforded by
sections 11 and 12(a)(2). This statutory background provides a reference
point by which to contrast the realities of the book-entry system. The
second step is to understand that system’s mechanics in relation to the
old system responsible for the Paper Crunch. Establishing the gap
between these statutory remedies and practical procedures for offered
securities creates a context for understanding this conception of tracing.
This in turn sets up the remedial, and ultimately the intradisciplinary,
conception of tracing.
A. The Securities Act of 1933
In the shadow of the “Black Days,”68 and the ensuing Great
Depression, Congress enacted the Securities Act.69 Otherwise known as
the “Truth in Securities” Act,70 this “remarkable piece of legislation”71
68
See, e.g., Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 408 n.97 (1990) (“[T]here was hardly an American
who was not aware of its occurrence and who did not date hard times from, and associate
his distress with, the black days of October 1929”) (citing DAVID SAUL LEVIN,
REGULATING THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 59 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University)).
69
15 U.S.C. § 77k et seq. (2003); see also Gadsby, supra note 11, at 9 (“The
Securities Act of 1933 . . . became effective on July 7, 1933, a date roughly
corresponding to the low point in the stock market and in our general economy.”); James
M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
29, 30 (1959) (“The [Securities] [A]ct naturally had its beginnings in the high financing
of the Twenties that was followed by the market crash of 1929.”). This is not to suggest
that Black Monday caused the Great Depression or that either event singularly prompted
Congress to adopt the Securities Act. See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF WALL STREET--A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE 33, 39 (1982) (“[M]uch more than the depression or the preceding
market crash, it was the Pecora hearings [examining banking institutions and
personalities] that influenced the character of the 1933 Securities Act and of the
Securities and Exchange Commission later created to enforce it.”); see also Bevis
Longstreth, The SEC After Fifty Years: An Assessment of Its Past and Future, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (1983) (“[T]he picture that emerges [from Seligman’s
account] is one of considerate controversy and political horse trading.”). According to
the Securities Act’s legislative history, “[t]he general belief among legislators was that
many underwriters and dealers in securities had not been operating in a fair, honest, and
prudent manner.” Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A
Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Act of 1934, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 334-35 (1988).
70
See, e.g., William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of
1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171 (1933) (“All the [Securities] Act pretends to do is to require
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has the express purpose of “provid[ing] full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof . . . .”72
According to then-President Franklin Roosevelt, the Securities Act “adds
to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine ‘let the seller
also beware.’ It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the
seller.”73 Specifically, through registration requirements, the Securities
Act strives to provide investors with adequate disclosures and thereby
guard against fraudulent offers and sales of all securities.74
The Securities Act provides two private civil remedies for fraud
connected with an offer of securities.75 Section 11 imposes strict liability
on persons directly76 involved in an offering whose registration statement
the ‘truth about securities’ at the time of issue, and to impose a penalty for failure to tell
the truth. Once it is told, the matter is left to the investor.”).
71
Cohen, supra note 1, at 1344; but cf. Adolph A. Berle, High Finance: Master or
Servant, 23 YALE REV. 20, 42 (1933) (describing the Securities Act as “spectacular,” and
yet also “salutary,” in its failure “to solve the problem of who is entitled to the increment
of value arising from organization, or the increment of power arising from control”);
Amy L. Goodman, It’s Past Time To Rethink the Securities Act of 1933, 14 INSIGHTS 2, 2
(2000) (“[B]efore the registration statement is filed, no ‘offers to sell may be made’ and
prior to the SEC declaring the registration statement to be effective (the waiting period),
no written offers may be made. The end result is that in many ways the Securities Act is
an antidisclosure statute.”).
72
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2004); see also S. REP. NO. 47, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1933),
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 17, at 1 (comp. by Jack S. Ellenberg & Ellen P. Mahar
1973) (“The basic policy is that of informing the investors of the facts concerning
securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing
protection against fraud and misrepresentation.”) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
The Securities Act further provides that the SEC, whenever “required to determine
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,” “shall also consider,
in addition to the protection of investors, whether action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.” 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b).
73
H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 72, item 18, at 2 (Statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt); see
also Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 49, at 338 (“The aim [of President Roosevelt’s call
for federal securities legislation] was to be ‘full publicity and information, and that no
essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying
public.’”).
74
See, e.g., Gadsby, supra note 11, at 9 (“The two principal objectives of the 1933
act were, first, to protect investors by requiring adequate and accurate disclosure
regarding securities distributed to the public in interstate commerce or by use of the mail,
and, second, to outlaw fraud in the sale of all securities whether or not newly issued.”);
Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for
Fraudulent Trading in Postdistribution Markets, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 847, 871
(1991) (“Adoption of the 1933 Act served a two-fold purpose. First, Congress intended
to provide prospective investors with full disclosure through the section 5 registration
obligation. . . . Second, Congress intended to outlaw fraud in connection with the offer
and sale of any security, whether registered or unregistered.”).
75
This article does not address remedies under sections 15 and 17(a) of the
Securities Act as they are not subject to the tracing requirement.
76
Five classes of defendants can be held liable under section 11: (1) the issuer; (2)
its current directors or partners; (3) its future directors or partners who have consented to
being named in the registration statement; (4) experts who have consented to being
named as having prepared or certified the registration statement; and (5) underwriters.
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misstates or omits material facts.77 As reliance is generally presumed,78 a
prima facie case requires only proof of a material misstatement or
omission.79 In comparison section 12(a)(2) imposes essentially a
See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5) (2004). There have been unsuccessful attempts to attach
section 11 liability to a sixth class of defendants, institutional investors. See, e.g.,
Jennifer O’Hare, Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, and the Specter of Liability
Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 217, 222 (“The
argument that institutional investors are subject to liability under Section 11 has so far
been rejected by the courts.”) (citing cases). For the issuer, liability “is virtually absolute,
even for innocent misstatements.” Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
382 (1982). For other classes of defendants, there is a due diligence defense. See 15
U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2004).
77
Section 11 relevantly provides:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted
to state a material fact required to be stated therein not misleading,
any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time
of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either
at law or in equity, sue . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2004); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11:
Public Offering Liability in a Continuous Disclosure Environment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 45, 45 (2000) (“[S]trict liability . . . and the failure of ‘due diligence’ liability . . .
[have made] Section 11 the ‘bête noire,’ in Louis Loss’s words, of the legislative
scheme.”) (quoting LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4246 (3d ed.
1991)).
78
See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2004). Reliance is presumed for one year after the posteffective date. Id. Of course, this is a variation of the “fraud on the market” theory first
established in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988), and its underlying
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH), seminally formulated in Eugene Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970), and famously applied to law in Reinier H. Kraakman & Ronald J. Gilson, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). Among the more serious
challenges to the EMCH have come from legal decision theory, otherwise known as
behavioral law and economics. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias (Oct. 2003)
(incorporating insights from legal decision theory into their MOME thesis), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=462786; Lynn Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency:
An Introduction to the New Finance (Dec. 2003) (exploring financial literature on asset
pricing, arbitrage, and behavioral phenomena that suggests alternative ways to analyze
market behavior), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=470161.
There are, however, extensive concerns about legal decision theory and its critique
of the EMCH. For instance, Greg Mitchell has argued that:
[A] great deal of psychological research . . . brings into question the
claims of the legal decision theorists regarding the fallibility of
judgment and decision making in experimental settings and qualifies
the generalizations that can be safely drawn from this research.
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of
the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1936 (2002); see
also Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 59, 80 (2003) (“I suspect that the end result [of the behavioral theory influx] will
not be an abandonment of the belief of many in the profession that the stock market is
remarkably efficient in its utilization of information.”). But cf., e.g., Jeffrey L.
Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious
Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000).
79
Section 11 limits total liability to the aggregate offering price. See 15 U.S.C. §
77k(g) (2004). Section 11 damages are calculated by a complex formula that subtracts
from the purchase price of a security (a) its sale price, if sold prior to the lawsuit, or (b)
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negligence standard upon offerors or sellers80 of securities that sign or
prepare prospectuses or oral communications in connection with an
offering of securities.81 Although reliance is also presumed,82 a prima
facie case under section 12(a)(2) requires a three-fold showing: (1) the
prospectus or oral communication misstates or omits a material fact, (2)
the registered securityholder must not have known of the fraud at the
time of purchase, and (3) privity exists between the registered security
and the seller defendant.83
Moreover, unlike their section 11
counterparts, section 12(a)(2) defendants have a defense that they did not
and reasonably could not know of the material misstatement or
omission.84 Both of these private civil remedies, however, represent a
its “true” value at the time the lawsuit commences, if retained throughout the lawsuit.
See id. at § 77k(e). If a section 11 plaintiff sells the relevant security after commencing
the lawsuit, but before judgment, courts will deduct the sales price only if it is less than
the true value; accordingly, “[t]he formula set forth in section 11(e) presents the plaintiff
who has not yet sold his or her securities with a strategic decision: whether or not to
sell.” 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.5[2], at 368 (2d ed.
1990). If a section 11 plaintiff retains the relevant security throughout the lawsuit,
subsequent price increases or decreases are irrelevant. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 19, at
437 (“This formula provides the shareholders who do not sell before suit with a potential
windfall if their securities appreciate after the filing date, but offers no protection if the
price declines after the judgment.”).
80
The level of active participation necessary to qualify a party as a “seller” under
section 12(a)(2) is a contentious subject. See, e.g., Joseph E. Reece, Would Someone
Please Tell Me the Definition of the Term ‘Seller’: The Confusion Surrounding Section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35 (1989) (recommending
consistency as between the definitions of “seller” in sections 12(a)(1) and 12(a)(2)). Due
to the privity requirement, there is only class of section 12(a)(2) defendants. See infra
note 83.
81
Section 12(a)(2) relevantly provides:
Any person who . . . offers or sells a security . . . by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable . . . to the person purchasing such security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2004); cf. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 77, at 982 (opining that “it is
best not to attempt a paraphrase” of section 12(a)(2) as it is “not too happily drafted”).
82
See, e.g., Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 689 (3d Cir.
1991); Smole v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1990); Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 619, F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc.,
609 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980); Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs, & Co., 560
F.2d 916, 923 (8th Cir. 1977).
83
See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2004). Section 12(a)(2) damages are based on the
purchase price of the security, if sold prior to the lawsuit, or limited to rescission of the
purchase of the security, if retained throughout the lawsuit. See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 77, at 983 (“Rescission and § 12(2) are substantially the same in that both
require the buyer to prove a ‘misrepresentation’ of fact.’”).
84
See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2004). See also generally Therese H. Maynard, The
Affirmative Defense of Reasonable Care Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
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deterrence-based approach to preventing fraudulent offerings of
securities.85
B. The Book-Entry System
Three decades after the enactment of the Securities Act, brokers and
dealers found themselves in the “Paper Crunch.”86 By the late 1960’s,
the daily trading volume had increased to approximately thirteen million
within a system designed to process only three million.87 As a result,
The back offices of many a broker-dealer resembled a
trackless forest. . . . Stock certificates and related
documents were piled “halfway to the ceiling” in some
offices; clerical personnel were working overtime, six
and seven days a week, with some firms using a second
or even a third shift to process each day’s transaction.
Hours of trading on the exchange and over the counter

1933, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (1993). This “reasonable care” standard is different
than section 11’s “due diligence” language. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) with 15 U.S.C.
§ 77l(2).
85
See, e.g., Concerning Litigation Under TI-IF, Federal Securities laws, Before the
House Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm. On Energy and
Commerce, Fed. News Serv. (July 22, 1994) (referencing “the importance of private
actions under the federal securities law” to provide “deterrence against securities law
violations”) (Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n). See
also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 613 (1985) (“True, people sometimes say that the function of
securities law is ‘the protection of investors’ or ‘compensation for wrongs,’ but these are
just restatements of the objective of efficient operation of the markets.”); Theresa A.
Gabaldon, Causation, Courts, and Congress: A Study of Contradiction in the Federal
Securities Laws, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1060 (1990) (“[D]eterrence is the logical, and
acknowledged, congressional goal; its method of accomplishment is imposition of a
penalty that sometimes theoretically will equal but sometimes will exceed the defendant’s
gain from any misrepresentation.”). Cf. A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A
Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85
VA. L. REV. 925, 945 (1999) (“Deterrence plays an important role in reducing [the
principal social costs produced by fraud on the market]. Compensation, by contrast, does
little reduce the costs of fraud on the market.”).
86
SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 28.
87
Id. As a reference point, on January 2, 1934, only 1.27 million shares were traded
on the New York Stock Exchange.
NYSE Statistics Archive, available at
http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/p1020656068262.html?displayPage=%2Fmarketinfo%
2F1022221393893.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). The increase in trading volume that
induced the Paper Crunch is attributable to the rise of over-the-counter markets and large
financial institutions. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Law’s Signal: A Cueing Theory of
Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 215, 274 (2004) (“Over-the-counter . . .
began to acquire substantial and growing market share. By the late 1950s, large financial
institutions were actively trading large blocks of equity securities. Over the next decade,
this trend would produce a quadrupling of equity share volume.”). “Today, the system
can easily handle trading volume on routine days of hundreds of millions of shares.”
Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 4. The all-time record for shares traded in one day on
the New York Stock Exchange is 2.81 billion shares on July 24, 2002. NYSE Statistics
Archive, available at http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/p1020656068262.html?display
Page=%2Fmarketinfo%2F1022221393893.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
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were curtailed to give back offices additional time after
the closing bell.88
For instance, from June 12 to December 31, 1968, the New York Stock
Exchange suspended all trading on Wednesdays to allow brokerage firms
time to process trades.89 By late 1969 stock prices began to decline, and
a concomitant reduction in trading volume contributed to the liquidation
of over 160 brokerage firms, impacting thousands of their customers.90
According to Joel Seligman, the Paper Crunch “was the most serious
failure of securities industry self-regulation in the Commission’s
history,” a complete “collapse of industry regulatory controls . . . .”91
The object of ensuing reform efforts was the very system for
processing securities. Until 1970 clearing and settlement of trades
involved the physical movement of paper stock certificates.92 These
unique certificates, issued by a corporation, evidenced their holder’s
ownership and its accompanying rights.93 To effect a trade, brokers and
dealers wrote the transferee’s name on the back of the certificate and
then delivered the actual certificate to the issuer, who then recorded on
its books the change in ownership.94 Even in light of the technological
88

SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 13; see also Clearance
and Settlement of Securities Transactions: Hearings on S.3412, S.3297 and S.2551
Before the Subcomm. On Securities of the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 95-96 (1972) (reporting that, in December, 1968,
member firms of the New York Stock Exchange had failed to deliver $4.4. billion and to
receive $4.7 million in securities to brokers or dealers within the customary five business
day settlement period) (Statement of William J. Carey, Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission). But cf. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This
Time?, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 291, 312 n.42 (contending drafters of 1997
amendments to Article 8 of the UCC “thought that the ‘paper crunch’ was a problem of
too many pieces of paper” and “did not consider that the colloquial phrase ‘paper work’
is shorthand for any form of clerical work, regardless of the presence or absence of
physical pieces of paper.”).
89
Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Security Interests Under Article 8 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 557, 562 n.13 (1990).
90
See, e.g., SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 14; S. REP.
NO. 92-1009, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1971); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1519, at 9-10 (1972).
91
SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 450.
92
See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfers
and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
307, 316-17 (1990) (defining “clearing” as “the process whereby the trades are compared,
matched, and confirmed” and “settling” as “the process whereby parties to trades fulfill
their obligations thereunder-generally a ‘delivery’ of the securities by the seller and
payment of the agreed price by the buyer”).
93
See, e.g., Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 2-3 (“Ownership of securities was
traditionally evidenced by possession of the certificates . . . .”). Some states, however, do
not require corporations to issue stock certificates to shareholders. See, e.g., Cal. Corp.
Code § 12401(a) (2003). See also REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.26(a) (3d ed. 2004)
(“Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, the board of directors
of a corporation may authorize the issue of some or all of the shares of any or all of its
classes or series without certificates.”).
94
See, e.g., Suellen M. Wolfe, Escheat and the Concept of Apportionment: A Bright
Line Test to Slice a Shadow, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173 (1995) (“Prior to 1970 . . . [t]he owner
would endorse the physical certificate to the name of the assignee on the back of the
certificate . . . . If the parties used the services of a broker, the seller would transfer the
certificate to his brokerage firm.”).
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limitations at that time,95 the process was expensive in its consumption of
time and susceptibility to error.96
Congress responded by enacting the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970 (SIPA).97 Specifically, SIPA directed the SEC to “facilitate
the establishment of a national system for the prompt and accurate
clearance and settlement of transactions in securities.”98 By the end of
1971 the SEC reported the creation of a “nationwide net-by-net clearance
and settlement system for over the counter securities which promises to
minimize substantially the handling of certificates and speed up the
entire transaction process with regard to those securities for the bulk of
the certificate handling problems.”99 This in turn lead to the eventual
introduction of a national book-entry system.100
As with its accounting counterpart,101 the book-entry system involves
a combination of physical and non-physical securities.102 Corporations
95

See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of
Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985).
96
See, e.g., Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 3 (“Transfer of securities in the
traditional certificate-based system was a complicated, labor-intensive process.”).
According to the SEC’s assessment of the Paper Crunch, “the primary cause of the
industry’s problems was its inability to accurately, promptly and inexpensively record
and process the substantially increased trading volume of the late 1960’s.” SEC, UNSAFE
AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 28; see also Guttman, supra note 23, at 718
n.8 (citing causes of failure for 64 securities firms liquidated under SIPA, with “poor
books and records” being the most prevalent reason in 44 cases).
97
15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78lll (2004). According to Thomas Joo,
although SIPA was designed to protect broker-dealers by promoting
investor confidence, the loss of investor confidence was not the cause
of the failures that inspired SIPA. Rather, the reverse was the case:
Congress feared the failures attributed to the back office crisis were
causing a loss of confidence.
Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection Act,
Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1082
(1999).
98
15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(a)(2) (1976); see also In re Nat’l Sec. Clearing Corp. for
Registration as a Clearing Agency, SEC Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-13,163 (Jan. 13,
1977), codified at 42 Fed. Reg. 396 (delineating, in response to the congressional
directive, characteristics for a national clearing and settlement system).
99
SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 34.
100
The U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve actually began to implement a book-entry
system before the Paper Crunch’s onset in 1966, albeit only for Treasury securities. See
Kenneth D. Garbade, Origins of the Federal Reserve Book-Entry System, FRBNY ECON.
POL’Y REV. 7-10 (forthcoming 2004), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/
forthcoming/garbade.pdf. See also generally Hamilton F. Potter, Jr. & David L. McLean,
Introduction to Book Entry Transfer of Securities, 28 BUS. L. REV. 209 (1972).
101
See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 94, at 185 (“The book entry system operates like the
accounting system of the same name.”).
102
The UCC briefly contemplated a purely uncertificated system, in which, “instead
of surrendering an indorsed certificate for registration of transfer, an instruction would be
sent to the issuer directing it to register the transfer.” Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 3.
This system, however, never completely materialized. See, e.g., Schroeder & Carlson,
supra note 89, at 559-60. What actually emerged was the indirect holding system, in
which “the issuer’s records do not show the identity of all of the beneficial owners.
Instead, a large portion of the outstanding securities of any given issue are recorded on
the issuer’s records as belonging to a depository.” Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 6.
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still issue physical stock certificates, but they now typically are placed in
the control of a depository,103 and registered in the name of a third party,
or a “street name.”104 Clearing and settling occurs in three phases.105
Customers first instruct their brokers to buy or sell the relevant securities.
Brokers then send that instruction to the clearing corporation. Finally,
the clearing corporation proceeds to compare the reported information,
debit or credit the appropriate trading account, and issue a report to the
brokers indicating their net obligation to deliver or receive securities.106
The book-entry system’s efficiency is attributable principally to a
streamlining of the brokerage function. Pre-SIPA, brokers were
responsible for processing the legal sale and physical transfer of paper
stock certificates.107 The book-entry system eliminated the need for
physical transfer by bifurcating the process of legal sale. Brokers remain
responsible for negotiating and settling trades, but their clearance is now
the responsibility of an independent intermediary, usually Depository
Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC).108 This intermediary serves as
This article focuses only on the indirect holding system and its complicating effect on the
tracing requirement.
103
In 1968, to track the transfer and volume of shares among its member brokerdealers, the New York Stock Exchange established the Central Certificate Service (CCS).
See DTCC: Evolution of DTC and NSCC, http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/history.htm
(last visited Feb. 15, 2005). In 1973 Depository Trust Company (DTC) was established
to “immobilize securities for broker-dealers and banks, complete the book-entry delivery
of those securities, and handle the myriad operational tasks required to provide
centralized, automated processing.” Id. DTC has subsumed CCS and is now the nation’s
largest securities repository; at the end of 2003, DTC had decreased its paper stock
holdings to 4.6 million, approximately 20 million less than over a decade ago. See The
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, 2003 Annual Report:
Leading the
Transformation, at 28 (2004), available at http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/annual.htm.
Along with the National Securities Clearing Corporation, DTC is a wholly owned
subsidiary of The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. See About DTCC,
http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005); see also infra note
108.
104
See, e.g., Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Developments in Trading
Claims: Participations and Disputed Claims, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 733, 747 (1993)
(“Most securities are not held ‘of record’ by their true owners.”). Most securities are
registered in the name of Cede & Company, a partnership whose “sole function . . . is to
maintain registered ownership of securities deposited with DTC.” Mooney, supra note
92, at 319 n.34; see also Joo, supra note 97, at 1073 n.3 (“Stock held in street name can
represent as much as 80% of a public company’s outstanding shares.”).
105
But cf. SEC, SAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 1 (“Clearance,
settlement, depository and transfer functions form part of a continuous process.”).
106
Guttman, supra note 23, at 724-26.
107
See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
108
Created in 1999, DTCC is owned by banks, brokers and dealers, mutual fund
firms, and its two preferred shareholders, the National Association of Securities Dealers
and New York Stock Exchange. See About DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005); see also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities
Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 868 n.69 (2002) (describing DTC as “an entity
that owes much of its existence to the efficiency of not depending upon individual owners
to physically deliver share certificates to an intermediary each time the securities are
sold”). Before DTCC, DTC was responsible for clearing functions. See supra note 103.
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the repository for stock certificates, thereby diminishing paper-based
traffic and its corresponding costs.109
This innovation to the clearing and settlement process, however, is
not without consequences. Brokers no longer act as intermediaries
between an issuer and a securityholder. Instead there is a series of
interlocking contracts:
[I]ndividual beneficial owners of securities have no
direct contractual relationships with the depository-rather, individuals have contractual relationships with
their brokers, which in turn have contractual
relationships with the depository or, as is often the case,
relationships with another intermediary . . . which in turn
is in privity with the depository.110
A path, therefore, does exists from a securityholder to the depository, but
there is no real connection between the depository and the issuer. Thus
there is no longer a path between the issuer and a securityholder.
Further, the book-entry system centralizes custody of securities by
altering their very nature: securities are now fungible financial
instruments.111 The use of a common nominee means that there is no real
difference between any of the securities held by the depository; one
security is as tradable as another.112 To be sure, this is what ensures that
the book-entry system will not suffer from another Paper Crunch. And
that catastrophic collapse militates against revisiting any sort of
processing system that depends on paper stock certificates.
Nevertheless, the book-entry system has severed the securityholder’s
relationships to a particular security and to its issuer.

109

Computerizing the clearance process undeniably has reduced the need for paper
stock certificates. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 92, at 320 n.37 (“The principal savings
from eliminating certificates would relate to DTC[C]’s costs of physical storage,
retrieval, deposit and withdrawal of certificates for participants’ customers.”). This
technological innovation, however, is distinct from and arguably less significant than the
structural innovation of a centralized custodian of either paper or uncertificated securities.
See, e.g., id. at 320 (“Even without actually eliminating paper certificates, the successful
development by DTC[C] of the ‘book entry only’ (BEO) system for securities issuance
and transfer has resulted in substantial savings for securities issuers.”).
110
Joo, supra note 97, at 1073 n.3. Privity here is distinct from what is required by
section 12(a)(2). See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
111
See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 92, at 319-20 n.34 (“Were the securities not part of
a fungible bulk, much of the benefit of the intermediary control phenomenon would
evaporate.”).
112
See, e.g., id. at 310 (“The property interest received by a purchase on the books
of its securities intermediary bears little resemblance to the property interest resulting
from a physical delivery of a certificated security or registration on the books of an
issuer.”). But cf., e.g., Guttman, supra note 23, at 719 (“The system which is evolving is
one applicable to the securities industry as such and does not affect the individual
investor, unless the investor insists on becoming a registered owner of his shares or
desires to hold the certificate himself . . . .”).
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C. Doctrinal Methods
The severance has cast doubt over which shareholders may have
access to private civil remedies under the Securities Act for fraudulent
offerings. Neither section 11 nor 12(a)(2) provides an explicit answer.
Section 11 merely states that “[i]n case any part of the registration
statement” contains such misstatements or omissions, “any person
acquiring such security . . . may, either at law or in equity, sue . . . .”113
Similarly, section 12(a)(2) provides that “[a]ny person who . . . offers or
sells a security . . . shall be liable . . . to the person purchasing such
security from him, who may sue either at law or equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction . . . .”114 Absent from these provisions is any
sense of what “such security” one must purchase to be entitled to relief.115
Is a remedy under the Securities Act available to a person who purchases
any security similar to that issued in a particular offering? Or must a
person purchase a security actually issued in the relevant offering to be
eligible for relief?
The judicial answer comes in the form of a tracing requirement.
Since 1967,116 courts have interpreted section 11 “as applying only to
purchasers who can trace the lineage of their shares to the new offering .
. .”;117 and, building on the troubling decision in Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co.,118 courts subsequently have interpreted section 12(a)(2) as requiring

113

15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2004) (emphasis added); see also Barnes v. Osofsky, 373
F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1967) (“The key phrase is ‘any person acquiring such security’;
the difficulty, presented when as here the registration is of shares in addition to those
already being traded, is that ‘such’ has no referent.”).
114
15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2004) (emphasis added).
115
This is distinct from the grand question of what actually constitutes a “security.”
See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 77, 923-1138.19.
116
This slightly precedes the enactment of SIPA, which introduced the book-entry
system. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
117
Barnes, 373 F.2d at 271; see also Curnin & Ford, supra note 11, at 165 n.60
(citing cases); Sale, supra note 19, at 453 n.163 (citing cases). Interestingly, the
shareholder plaintiffs in Barnes were the ones who characterized this interpretation of
section 11 as “tracing.” Id.
118
513 U.S. 561 (1995). The Gustafson Court held that a private stock placement
agreement did not constitute a “prospectus,” and thus was not sufficiently connected with
an initial offering to be actionable under section 12(a)(2). Id. at 583. Prior to Gustafson
a virtual consensus existed among courts and commentators that section 12(a)(2)
permitted claims concerning secondary and private purchases of securities. Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent in Gustafson observed that:
Commentators writing shortly after passage of the Act understood §
12(2) to cover resales and private sales, as well as public offerings.
Felix Frankfurter, organizer of the team that drafted the statute,
firmly stated this view. . . . Most subsequent commentators have
agreed that § 12(2), like § 17(a), is not confined to public offerings.
Id. at 601-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Not surprisingly, the Court’s
decision has been the subject of vigorous criticism. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge,
Securities Act Section 12(2): After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 BUS. LAW. 1231, 1270
(1995) (“[T]he majority opinion is at best bizarre and borders on the irresponsibly
unintelligible.”).
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plaintiffs to “trace” their securities to an initial public offering.119 In
essence tracing withholds access to private civil relief unless plaintiffs
can prove that they purchased a security from a specific public offering
involving a material misstatement or omission.120
The requirement can be understood by its impact on three primary
classes of securityholders, defined by their proximity to a public
offering.121
The first class comprises securityholders that have
unmediated access to a public offering (Class I), a limited group that
includes institutional investors and underwriters as well as their spinning
partners.122 The second class comprises securityholders that have access
the public offering only through a secondary market (Class II), otherwise
known as the “aftermarket.”123 Finally, the third class comprises
securityholders that have no access to a public offering (Class III), but
instead purchase similar types of securities in a different offering.124
These classes have varying access to private civil remedies under the
Securities Act depending on the tracing method a court may apply.
Direct Tracing, “the easiest method to understand and prove,”125 is
119
See, e.g., Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp. 964 F.2d 272, 287 (3d Cir. 1992) (“If
defendants were eventually to prove that the shares came from the secondary market, §
12(2) would not apply, and judgment would be entered for them.”); see also supra notes
118 and accompanying text. Interestingly, only the Third and Eleventh Circuits have
made an explicit appellate reference to the tracing requirement under section 12(a)(2).
See, e.g., First Union Disc. Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835 (11th Cir.
1993) (“[W]e are persuaded by the Third Circuit’s reasoning and hold that section 12(2)
of the 1933 Act does not apply to aftermarket transactions.”) (citations omitted); see also
Sale, supra note 19, at 454 nn.164-67 (citing district court cases). Other courts instead
tend to discuss tracing under section 12(a)(2) in the guise of either the privity
requirement, see supra note 83 and accompanying text, or aftermarket purchases, see
infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
120
Sale, supra note 19, at 441 (“Courts use the term ‘tracing’ to refer to the
judicially created requirement that to access sections 11 and 12(a)(2) shareholders must
plead and prove that they bought shares issued either ‘in’ the public offering for which
the registration statement or prospectus was issued, or ‘pursuant to’ that offering.”)
(citing Feiner v. SS&C Techs., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252 (D. Conn. 1999)).
121
See supra note 30.
122
See, e.g., In re: Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., Nos. 21 MC 92, 01 Civ. 3857,
01 Civ. 8408, 01 Civ. 7048, 01 Civ. 9417, 01 Civ. 6001, 01 Civ. 0242, 2004 WL
2297401, at *37-*39 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004) (citing cases). See also Hillary A. Sale,
Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 415 (2003)
(“Members of Congress have benefited from investment bank largesse. Some members
benefited from spinning, receiving IPO shares at the offering price that they were allowed
to flip in the market at easy profits.”). See also supra note 32.
123
See, e.g., In re: IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *37-*39 (citing cases). Small and
individual investors are usually Class II securityholders as they “can rarely get in on . . .
hot initial public offerings (IPOs) because IPOs are largely private club[s] that the
average investor [i]sn’t invited to join.” Sale, supra note 19, at 441 (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
124
See, e.g., id. at 443.
125
Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (D. Minn. 1984), aff’d, 760 F.2d
272 (8th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision). Notably, the Supreme Court has
rejected the need for Direct Tracing in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2004), which
governs theft or bribery in connection with programs receiving federal funds. See, e.g.,
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997). See also United States v. Cabrera, 328 F.3d
506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “circuits have since split on whether to require a
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correspondingly also the most accepted.126 Courts assess a plaintiff’s
ability to trace their purchased securities directly back to a specific
offering by examining multiple factors:
[A]n indication of interest by the broker on behalf of the
customer, the customer’s receipt of a preliminary
prospectus with a legend in red ink (called a “red
herring”), a notation on the purchase order ticket
showing purchase in the offering, purchase at the
offering price, lack of commission, language regarding
the prospectus on the customer’s confirmation slip, and
special coding of the transaction by the brokerage
firm.127
Satisfying these factors is relatively easy for Class I securityholders, as
they have an opportunity to purchase a security prior to its entrance into
the aftermarket.
Class II and III securityholders, however, face a significant practical
problem. Courtesy of the book-entry system, these two classes of
securityholders are simply beneficial owners, and not record holders, of
publicly offered securities.128 And, because of centralized repositories,
these securities are fungible.129 This is unproblematic when an issuer has
conducted only one offering, as its connection to all of the securities
purchased is inferentially clear.130 But issuers can, and often do, conduct
multiple offerings.131 In such circumstances courts have held that “a
plaintiff is entitled to a presumption that she has satisfied the tracing
requirement . . . only if every such offering was defective.”132
Accordingly, whenever one among multiple offerings is non-fraudulent,
Class II and III securityholders cannot trace their aftermarket purchases.
The Fungible Mass Tracing method attempts to address this problem.
Statistical probability determines whether a particular security is part of a
specific public offering. Courts calculate this probability by simply
dividing the number of shares issued in the disputed public offering by
the number of total shares issued in all public offerings. In the case of
one offering the probability would be 100% that the plaintiffs purchased
securities in connection with material misstatements or omissions. In the
case of multiple offerings the probability must be “some particular

federal nexus [between theft or bribery and expenditure of federal funds], with [the
Second and Third Circuits] requiring one and [the Sixth and Seventh Circuits] holding
that none is required”).
126
See, e.g., In re: IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *37-*39 (citing cases).
127
Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1378 (citation omitted).
128
See supra notes 104, 110-112, and accompanying text.
129
See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
130
See, e.g., In re: IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38 (“Tracing may be established . .
. through proof that the owner bought her shares in a market containing only shares issued
pursuant to an allegedly defective registration statement.”) (emphasis added).
131
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
132
In re: IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *39 (emphasis added).
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number” that constitutes a preponderance of the evidence,133 roughly
quantified by some courts and commentators as greater than 50%.134
Courts, however, generally have rejected the Fungible Mass method
within the securities context. First, the method establishes only that
certain securities “might,” and not actually, have been issued in a
specific fraudulent offering; this is an inferential leap in causation that
courts have refused to make.135 Second, the method provides remedies to
an overinclusive class of securityholders; provided the requisite
probability obtains, even plaintiffs with non-fraudulent securities could
trace successfully.136
A more reliable and less inclusive method is Contrabroker Tracing.
Under this method securityholders need to demonstrate a chain of
purchase from a broker to another broker or underwriter that directly
participated in the disputed offering.137 Proof of an underwriter’s
involvement, however, does not dispositively connect a security with the
offering; underwriters can be market-makers that facilitate over-thecounter trading by buying and selling securities that may not be from the
relevant offering.138 Moreover, the method is still overinclusive;
provided the contrabroking link exists, any securities purchased from that
broker or underwriter would enable any plaintiff to satisfy the tracing
requirement.139
Similar to the Contrabroker method’s focus on underwriters, the
Heritage method looks to the stock certificates for a causal link. The
method, the “most complex” one recognized by courts,140 follows the
path of stock certificates that bear unique code numbers from brokers to
purchasers. Not all stock certificates, however, bear unique code
numbers.141
Moreover, stock certificates reflect the increments
133

text.

134

Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1379; see also infra notes 242-243 and accompanying

See, e.g., In re Elscint, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374, 380 (D. Mass 1987).
See also infra note 244 and accompanying text.
135
See, e.g., In re: IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38-*39 (citing cases).
136
See, e.g., Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1380 (“Even if the court somehow limited
the class of plaintiffs to those who held shares on or after the offering date, all persons
who held stock in street on and after the offering date could claim a proportional interest
in the shares. The issuer could find itself liable for far more than the number of shares
issued in the challenged offering.”).
137
See, e.g., Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1381. No plaintiff has convinced a court to
apply this method, and so it is not discussed extensively here.
138
See, e.g., Mark A. Allebach, Small Business, Equity Financing, and the Internet:
The Evolution of a Solution?, 4 VA. J. L. & TECH. 3, 63 (1999) (“In a standard offering,
the underwriter may function as a market maker for the stock, facilitating secondary
trading.”).
139
Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1381 (“Obviously at some point plaintiffs’ assumption
must be false; otherwise anyone who ever purchased from a participant in the
underwriting after the offering date could claim he or she bought ‘new’ stock under this
contrabroker theory.”).
140
Id. at 1382. As with the Contrabroker method, no plaintiff has convinced a court
to apply the Heritage method, and so it is not discussed extensively here.
141
See, e.g., Sale, supra note 19, at 452 n. 153 (“Today . . . the usual practice is to
hold shares in street names. As a result, this [heritage] method is unlikely to prove
fruitful for modern shareholders.”). A simple solution might be to require all brokers or
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purchased, and not the specific offering involved.142 Accordingly, the
Heritage method provides perhaps the most speculative evidence of
causation between a securityholder’s purchase and an issuer’s
misstatements or omissions.
All of these tracing methods, however, suffer from the same glaring
problem. Whenever there are multiple offerings, the tracing requirement
arbitrarily segregates according to the securityholder class.143 Only Class
I securityholders have any reliable access to private civil remedies under
the Securities Act. Class II and III securityholders, however, must
overcome all the difficulties associated with the use of fungible securities
registered in street name. Accomplishing this feat, as courts have
acknowledged, is “virtually impossible.”144 Indeed, all of these possible
tracing methods are effectively an attempt to assist Class II and III
securityholders in this regard. But because this is a substantial group of
securityholders, the stringent application of the tracing requirement
inadvertently confers a benefit on defendants involved in multiple
offerings. As long as one of them involves non-fraudulent securities,
these defendants can eliminate or reduce their liability under sections 11
and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.145 The net effect, then, is that the
tracing requirement represents a way to avoid private civil remedies, and
thereby severely compromises their deterrence effect.
II. REMEDIAL TRACING
Part I established deficiencies within securities law’s tracing
requirement. These deficiencies prompt one to look beyond the
securities context and examine conceptions of tracing in other areas of
the law. This examination begins, and ends, with remedial law, the
original source of tracing.
Remedial tracing is a venerable product of civil law. The method’s
heritage is manifest in an ongoing controversy over distinct conceptions
of tracing in equity and at common law. The justification for all
conceptions of tracing, however, lies in restitution. Conventional
restitution seeks to redress unjust enrichment by disgorging benefits
centralized holding companies to keep records of which security is sold or purchased.
This is akin to the more conceptually sound designation system that I propose. See infra
Part III.C.
142
Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1381.
143
See, e.g., Barnes v. v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1967) (“[T]his
construction [of the tracing requirement] gives . . . a rather accidental impact as between
one open-market purchaser of a stock already being traded and another.”); Klein v.
Computer Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270, 273 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“If the purchaser
bought identical securities already being traded on the open market, he must look
elsewhere for relief.”).
144
In re: Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., Nos. 21 MC 92, 01 Civ. 3857, 01 Civ.
8408, 01 Civ. 7048, 01 Civ. 9417, 01 Civ. 6001, 01 Civ. 0242, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004); see also id. at *38 n.402 (“The advent of fungible bulk storage
has made plaintiffs’ tracing requirement a stringent one indeed . . . . “).
145
See supra note 36 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B.
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inequitably gained at another’s expense, while specific restitution seeks
to restore misappropriated value to its original owner.
Rules-based tracing reconciles both forms of restitution. Unlike
other competing conceptions, rules-based tracing does not focus on
assets or property, but rather the value inherent in things. The first step
is to determine whether misappropriated value has traveled into a
wrongdoer’s hands; this is part of an exercise known as “following,”
which is a factual inquiry that enables one ultimately to claim specific
restitution. Tracing, however, involves a substitution of value. The
second step, then, is to determine whether certain value in a wrongdoer’s
possession is derived from misappropriated value, and thus subject to a
claim of unjust enrichment.
Rules-based tracing also fares well with the classic problem of
commingled funds. The difficulty lies in the fact that such funds are
fungible instruments, as in the case of a bank account. Courts have
devised a myriad of rules for tracing through bank accounts where there
has been a deposit or withdrawal of the wrongdoer’s own funds. These
rules, which focus on assets or property, are not necessarily inconsistent
with a focus on value. But rules-based tracing does present a more
principled approach to bank accounts, by understanding them as a simple
exchange in value.
This Part completes the foundation necessary to set up the ultimate
intradisciplinary comparison between tracing within the securities and
remedial contexts. Although mindful of corollary securities notions, the
analysis here is not explicitly comparative. Rather, the analysis provides
a parallel account of rules-based tracing that ultimately suggests how it
may be applied to fungible securities.
A. Equitable and Legal Formulations
The origins of tracing date back to early eighteenth century civil
jurisprudence.146 English courts introduced the method as a way to
protect the ownership rights of beneficiaries in res from errant trustees.147
Specifically, the doctrine entitled beneficiaries to claim the proceeds of
146
See, e.g., Kendar v. Milward, 23 Eng. Rep. 882 (1702); Halcott v. Markant, 24
Eng. Rep. 81 (1701). For early American applications and analyses of remedial tracing,
see Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U.S. 707 (1914); National Bank v. Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 54
(1881); James Barr Ames, Following Misappropriated Property Into Its Product, 19
HARV. L. REV. 511 (1906); Samuel Williston, The Right to Follow Trust Property When
Confused With Other Property, 2 HARV. L. REV. 28 (1888). Among the doctrine’s
glorious applications involved Charles K. Ponzi’s pyramid scheme at the turn of the
twentieth century. See In re Ponzi, 268 F. 997 (D. Mass 1920); Lowell v. Brown, 280 F.
193 (D. Mass 1922); Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924). In adjudicating claims
against Ponzi’s estate Chief Justice William Taft opined that various creditors “must trace
the money, and therein they have failed.” Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 11.
147
Oesterle, supra note 43, at 186, 187 (noting that the birth of tracing “was
understandable: to provide relief against errant trustees, English equity courts granted
beneficiaries a proprietary right to follow misappropriated property into its product” and
that this right “was a fictional extension of the beneficiary’s fluid equitable ownership
interest in the trust res”). Oesterle provides a rich, historical account of remedial tracing.
See id. at 186-95.
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misappropriated res that a predatory trustee already had converted into a
different form. As one court explained,
[i]t makes no difference in reason or law into what other
form different from the original, the change may have
been made . . . for the product of or substitute for the
original thing still follows the nature of the thing itself,
as long as it can be ascertained to be such . . . .148
Such indifference to the proceeds’ ultimate form is possible because
tracing focuses on what lies in the custody of the wrongdoer, rather than
the whereabouts of the misappropriated res. This focus is premised on a
judicial assumption that the transfer of misappropriated res was valid.149
Characteristic of its vintage, tracing has concurrent equitable and
legal roots.150 Equity conferred a proprietary right upon the original
owner of misappropriated res to its proceeds; this conferral was
predicated on the wrongdoer assuming the role of a trustee that had
breached its fiduciary duty towards its principal, the original owner.151 In
contrast, the common law did not recognize the trust,152 and instead
148
Taylor v. Plumer, 105 Eng. Rep. 721, 726 (1815); see also In re Hallet’s Estate,
13 Ch. D. 696, 708-09 (1879) (“There is no distinction. . . between a rightful and
wrongful disposition of the property, so far as regards the right of the beneficial owner to
follow the proceeds.”) (emphasis added). But see infra Part II.B.
149
See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 188 (“[A]t the plaintiff’s election a court
would presume conclusively that the errant trustee had acted with proper authority when
the exchange was made. This simple fiction of regularity was the seed of all current
tracing doctrine.”) (citing cases).
150
See, e.g., Paul Matthews, The Legal and Moral Limits of Common Law Tracing,
in LAUNDERING AND TRACING 23, 31-32 (Peter H. Birks ed., 1995) (“There are two
different sets of rules of tracing: those for tracing at common law, and those for tracing in
Equity. . . .”) (emphasis in original). Matthews maintains that this distinction makes
sense even in light of the merger of law and equity within the United States:
[I]f tracing has different rules at law and in equity, that is because the
rules were evolved to deal with different situations, and still do so. . .
. It may be pedagogically and analytically sensible to put both
systems together (without changing any rules) and to treat the
composite whole as ‘the rules of tracing’, although, given the
importance of history in understanding English law, I am inclined to
think that this would obscure rather more than it would illuminate.
Id. at 32 (emphasis in original); see also N.E. PALMER, BAILMENT 290 (2d ed. 1991)
(“This view that the common law doctrine of tracing has been fused with its equitable
counterpart has rightly been described as an expression of hope rather than a statement of
reality and weakens the expression of view accordingly.”); infra note 152.
151
See, e.g., ROY M. GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW § 11(ii), 52-53 (3d ed. 2004).
152
Considerable controversy exists within the civil law over whether common law
tracing requires a fiduciary relationship between the original owner of property and its
converter. See, e.g., Michael Scott, The Right to “Trace” at Common Law, 7 U.W. AUS.
L. REV. 463, 479 (1966) (“At common law . . . no fiduciary relationship needs to be
postulated . . . . It should not be necessary at this date to argue this last point; and within
the limits of this article it is scarcely possible, without wading into [a] morass of
academic controversy . . . .”). Lionel Smith disagrees:
It is sometimes said that a prerequisite to tracing in a court of equity
is the establishment of a fiduciary relationship. If this were true, the
consequences would be startling. . . . It is to be hoped that courts will
heed the weight of academic commentary and discard the notion that
a fiduciary relation is a prerequisite to tracing in equity.
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regarded the wrongdoer as a bailee whose sale of misappropriated goods
conferred the original owner with legal title to their proceeds.153
Although the differences are hardly trivial,154 these conceptions of
tracing do share a common principle. As Lionel Smith has noted,
equitable and legal tracing both “subordinate the interests of wrongdoers
in the same way” and also are “willing to treat non-wrongdoers
equally.”155 When presented with a choice between these parties, tracing
harnesses the powerful intuition that the law should relegate the
wrongdoer’s interests beneath those of the victim and any third party.156
And, by extension, even when the wrongdoer misappropriates and then
converts something into greater value, tracing can award that entire value
to the victim.157
The rationale for tracing is rooted within restitution itself. The law
of restitution, which concerns “benefit-based liability or benefit-based
SMITH, supra note 43, at 120, 130 (citations omitted)). There is even dispute over the
significance of tracing at common law. Compare, e.g., Scott, supra, at 466 (referencing
“the very pertinent fact that the great majority of ‘tracing’ cases are cases arising out of
common law relationships”), with SIR ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 48 (2d ed. 1978) (“In restitution the common law of tracing has been in
practice of little importance. . . . [E]quity has successfully intervened to enable claimants
to trace money and negotiable instruments, particularly when money has become mixed
with other money in a bank account.”). This fiduciary requirement historically has not
held true in American courts. See Oesterle, supra note 43, at 187 (“For years American
courts could afford to be lax on the matter because they do not require a fiduciary
relationship for tracing relief in equity.”). In any event the intradisciplinary conception
of tracing proposed here revolves around the Securities Act, which awards monetary
relief. See infra Part III.B.
153
See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 150, at 288 (“At common law, [a proprietary
claim] entails that the claimant should have an immediate right to possession of the goods
as against the defendant.”).
154
See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 151, § 11(ii), at 52-53 (comparing historical
conceptions of tracing in equity and law); Scott, supra note 152, at 479 (observing that
common law and equitable tracing differ in that “(a) the consequent right of action at
common law is not in personam, but in equity in rem, and (b) the common law right of
action can thus survive the loss or destruction of the res, while the equitable right of
action depends upon its continued possession by the defendant”).
155
SMITH, supra note 43, at 278. This is in contrast to the proprietary rights
rationale that other commentators frequently cite in support of tracing. See, e.g.,
PALMER, supra note 150, at 287-88 (“There are a number of reasons why a person may
wish to employ the proprietary remedy of tracing . . . . The most obvious reason is that a
person who has the right to trace will take priority over other creditors in the case of an
insolvency. . . .”).
156
See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 176-77 (“[T]he basic tracing paradigm has
substantial intuitive appeal. Notions of vindicating title, of deterring misappropriation, of
disgorging unlawfully acquired profits . . . all seem to coalesce in support of the result.”);
see also supra note 45.
157
See, e.g., id. at 176 (“In sum, courts find it more desirable to give the victim a
windfall . . . than to allow the wrongdoer to keep any profit.”). The most extreme version
of this principle is the “swollen assets” theory courts applied to bankruptcy cases during
the Great Depression. Upon a mere showing of an equitable wrong, courts would award
prioritized claims to certain victims over other third party creditors when the funds had
become commingled in an insolvent bank; most civil and common law courts reject this
theory. See, e.g., id. at 189 n.33. But see, e.g., 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 6.1(3), at 14 (1993) (“There is some
authority taking a more liberal view [of the swollen assets theory]. . . .”) (citing cases).
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recovery,”158 encompasses two distinct principles.159 First, “specific
restitution” provides relief in the form of restoration of the actual
misappropriated asset or property to its original owner.160 Second, unjust
enrichment provides various forms of relief to victims at whose expense
another party has obtained legally unjustifiable gains.161
Conventional conceptions of tracing can involve either of these
restitutionary principles. On one level tracing can provide specific
restitution to victims that identify misappropriated assets or property
within the hands of a defendant or a third party.162 On another level
tracing can redress unjust enrichment when there has been a substitution
or commingling of the victim’s misappropriated assets or property with
158

HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 1 (2004).
This distinction is the subject of intense controversy. See, e.g., Colleen P.
Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577, 1581-98 (2002).
Both the Restatement of the Law of Restitution and a significant group of civil and
common law scholars equate restitution with unjust enrichment. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 1; 1 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 1.1, at 6 (“[R]estitution
today is a general term for diverse kinds of recoveries aimed at preventing unjust
enrichment of the defendant and measured by the defendant’s gains . . . .”); Andrew Kull,
Restitution’s Outlaws, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 17, 17 (2003) (“The modern consensus puts
unjust enrichment at the heart of liability in restitution, so the question, simply put, is
whether restitution properly includes anything else.”). Other scholars believe unjust
enrichment is but a subdivision of restitution. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 294
(“The goal of restitution is to reverse the transfer of wealth from the plaintiff to the
defendant.”); Laycock, supra note 47, at 1279 (“’Restitution’ means recovery based on
and measured by unjust enrichment. It also means restoration in kind of a specific thing.
Both usages are part of any complete definition of restitution.”). But cf., e.g., Oesterle,
supra note 43, at 176 n.9 (“Restitution is most commonly understood . . . as a grab bag of
judge-made rules developed originally in both the early Anglo-American law and equity
courts.”). I take no position on the distinction, but use it only to clarify a subsequent
distinction between claiming, following, and tracing. See infra Part II.B.
160
Laycock, supra note 47, at 1279-80 (“[R]estitution continues to include remedies
that restore to plaintiff the specific thing he lost or that undo disrupted transactions and
restores both parties to their original positions in kind.”); see also RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 45, § 372(1) (“Specific restitution will be granted to a party who
is entitled to restitution.”); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 4, cmt. c
(“Specific restitution in actions at law”). Laycock believes there is a third sense of
restitution, compensatory damages, id. at 1282, which is not discussed as the Securities
Act’s remedies are based on a deterrence theory, see supra note 85 and accompanying
text. See also Murphy, supra note 159, at 1586 (asserting that prominent restitutionary
theorists “would agree that ‘restitution’ must be distinguished from ‘compensation,’ a
remedy measured by the plaintiff’s loss”).
161
See, e.g., GOFF & JONES, supra note 152, at 11 (“There are many circumstances
in which a defendant may find himself in possession of a benefit which, in justice, he
should restore to the plaintiff. . . . ‘Unjust Enrichment’ is, simply, the name which is
commonly given to the principle of justice which the law recognises [sic] and gives effect
to in a wide variety of claims of this kind.”); Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1995) (“Restitution, meaning the law of unjust enrichment . . .
[bases liability on the principle] that the defendant has been enriched without legal
justification at the expense of the plaintiff; it is not that the defendant has necessarily
done anything wrong.”); Nicholas J. McBride & Paul McGrath, The Nature of
Restitution, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 33 (1995) (contending that restitution entails only
a common law duty borne by the defendant to correct unjust enrichment).
162
See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
159
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those of a defendant or third party.163 Under either principle conventional
tracing thus represents a powerful re-allocative tool. The method enables
courts to impose the full costs of misappropriation on a wrongdoer, while
shifting all of the benefits to a victim ex post.
B. Rules-Based Tracing
Like the myriad of forms that misappropriated assets or property can
assume, the doctrine of tracing has mutated over time. According to
Lionel Smith, “[t]he complexity of tracing has been exacerbated by a
history of inexact use of language, and a consequent failure to distinguish
it from related matters.”164 Courts and commentators have referred to
tracing within and across legal contexts as “claiming,”165 “identifying,”166
“following,”167 “standing,”168 and “transactional links.”169 This semantic
confusion only complicates the substantive controversy over equitable
versus legal conceptions of tracing,170 and its basis in restitution as either
restoration or unjust enrichment.171
A way out of this morass is to have a principled understanding of
tracing, or what Lionel Smith calls “rules-based tracing.”172 This
conception presents tracing as a process by which courts apply legal
163
See infra Part II.C. See also Oesterle, supra note 43, at 175-76 (observing that
some theorists “argue that tracing is restitutionary in that the doctrine is premised on the
principle of unjust enrichment – the conceptual thread that is said to unite all
restitutionary doctrines.”). Oesterle, however, contends that “[t]he principle of unjust
enrichment cannot be defensibly invoked to justify most of the numerous applications of
tracing” because the doctrine is actually “a complicated façade for a rough doctrine of
causation.” Id. at 190.
164
SMITH, supra note 43, at 3.
165
See, e.g., GOFF & JONES, supra note 152, at 46-63.
166
See, e.g., BIRKS, supra note 45, at 358 (“The exercise of identifying the surviving
enrichment is called tracing.”); David Hayton, Equity’s Identification Rules, in BIRKS,
supra note 150, 1, 1 (“[T]he equitable rules where new assets have been acquired in place
of the original trust property . . . endeavour [sic] to identify the value of the original
property in new assets so as to ascertain the value surviving in the defendant’s hands.”);
Scott, supra note 152, at 478 (“[T]he word ‘trace’ is commonly used . . . as meaning no
more than ‘identify.’”).
167
See, e.g., Roy M. Goode, The Right to Trace and Its Impact in Commercial
Transactions-I, 92 L. Q. REV. 361, 369 (1976) (“[T]he right to follow denotes a right to
trace the asset into a changed form . . . .”); Williston, supra note 146, at 30 (referencing
the “right the cestui que trust always has, even though he may also be able to follow his
money into a certain investment”). See also supra note 148.
168
See supra note 12.
169
See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 174 (“The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving any transactional link between the misappropriated property and the property
found in the defendant’s hands.”). But cf. Simon Evans, Rethinking Tracing and the Law
of Restitution, 115 L. Q. REV. 469 (1999) (challenging the need for tracing to involve a
transactional link between the initial and surviving enrichment).
170
See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
171
See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
172
This is in contrast to the rights-based conception of tracing advanced by many
commentators. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 173 (defining tracing as a
“restitutionary right to claim specific property . . . that arises from a property interest of
the claimant in other property that another has misappropriated”). See also supra note
155.
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rules that determine whether certain value in a wrongdoer’s hands is
derivative of misappropriated value, and thus subject to a justifiable legal
claim.173 Significantly, unlike competing conceptions, rules-based
tracing focuses on value, rather than specific assets or property. This is
because tracing fundamentally concerns situations where a substitution
of misappropriated assets or property for other assets or property has
occurred:
The only connection which the plaintiff has to the new
thing is that it was acquired with the original thing. . . .
What is traced, then, is the value inherent in things. It is
value, not property or assets, which can be identified in
different forms after each substitution. The grammatical
object of ‘to trace’ is ‘value.’174
This is because no other component of tracing purely captures the
illicitness that the process seeks to remedy. Certainly, there is no
principled basis in focusing on the actual exchange between the
wrongdoer and an innocent third party, as that act can be legal.175 And
there is no principled basis in focusing on the specific path of the
property or assets, either of the misappropriated or substituted sort. On
the one hand, the path of the misappropriated property or assets simply
diverts the inquiry to an innocent third party that is equal to the victim in
the eyes of tracing.176 On the other hand, the path of substituted property
or assets does lead to the wrongdoer, but without any evidence of the
actual wrongdoing.177
Value properly orients the tracing inquiry. Fundamentally, value is
what the wrongdoer has misappropriated from the victim. Value is also a
sufficiently abstract notion to accommodate the shift to substituted

173
See GOODE, supra note 151, § 11(ii), at 53 (“[T]racing is . . . merely a legal
mechanism to establish that a benefit received by the defendant can be identified as
resulting from a diminution in the plaintiff’s assets.”); SMITH, supra note 43, at 6
(“Tracing identifies a new thing as the potential subject matter of a claim, on the basis
that it is the substitute for an original thing which was itself the subject matter of a
claim.”).
174
Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
175
See supra note 149 and accompanying text. Moreover, the form of the exchange
need not be the same for tracing to apply. See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 151, § 11(ii), at
53 (“[A]n improper transfer of value by novation is just as traceable as a transfer of value
by assignment.”).
176
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
177
The substituted property’s path may not even end up involving the wrongdoer, as
tracing still applies when the substituted property is in the custody of an intermediary or a
fourth party. Moreover, value can encompass scenarios in which both the wrongdoer
possesses both misappropriated and substituted property; one such instance involves a
company that redeems outstanding debt through the issuance of stock or proceeds from
lower cost debt. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,
570 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying injunctive relief against such redemption
even in light of a prohibitory clause in an indenture). Borrowing companies can avoid
this question altogether simply by entering into an interest rate swap agreement while
issuing debt. I thank Lawrence A. Cunningham for this point.
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property that the victim seeks to claim.178 As one commentator has
observed, the notion of value eliminates the “need to show any physical
correlation between the asset the plaintiff lost and the asset the defendant
received.”179 Equally important, value “inheres in rights, where they are
rights in tangible things or not” and thus “simply reifies that which
inheres in an asset . . . .”180 In this way value also serves as a principled
basis for the victim’s claim.181
Reconceptualizing the method in this way clarifies two analytically
distinct processes that are often conflated with tracing itself.182 The first
process is what Professor Smith denotes “following.” This is an entirely
factual and mechanical exercise of locating the misappropriated value
that originally belonged to the victim; following “is not a claim or a right
in itself. . . . By itself, it does not make anyone liable.”183 Liability is the
domain of the second process, what Professor Smith denotes “claiming.”
This is a justificatory exercise of determining whether liability attaches;
claiming affords the victim rights to value, of either the misappropriated
or substituted sort.184

178

See SMITH, supra note 43, at 119 (“[Value] is the only constant that exists before,
through and after the substitution through which we trace. It exists in a different form
after the substitution, and that is what can justify a claim to the new asset.”). Another
way to conceptualize value is as a category enabling different assets or property to
become fungible. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 166, at 383 (“Fungibles are tangible assets
of which one unit is, in terms of an obligation owed by one party to another,
indistinguishable from any other unit . . . .”). This is not to say that the exchange
between the wrongdoer and an innocent third party consists of equivalent value. See id.
at 157 (“The concept of ‘tracing value’ does not imply or entail that the traceable
proceeds of an asset must have a market value equivalent to the market value of that
asset.”). Because the wrongdoer knowingly provides misappropriated value, that may be
or command less than what a legally acquired value would on the market. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1196 (1985) (“Since I am unwilling (because unable--but it does not matter why) to pay
[the original owner’s] price for [the misappropriated value], it follows that the
[misappropriated value] would be less valuable in an economic sense in my hands than in
his.”).
179
GOODE, supra note 151, § 11(ii), at 53.
180
SMITH, supra note 43, at 16.
181
Tracing does not by itself generate liability. See id. at 132; infra note 183 and
accompanying text.
182
The distinction between following, claiming, and tracing is not merely
theoretical. See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 151, at § 11 (ii), at 53 (“These concepts have
now been endorsed by the highest authority.”) (citing Foskett v. McKeown, 1 A.C. 102,
128 (2002)). American courts implicitly make the same distinction. See, e.g., In re
United Cigar Stores Co., 70 F.2d 313, 316 (2d Cir. 1934) (“There can be no recovery . . .
where all that can be shown is enrichment of the trustee.” Misappropriated trust property
“must be clearly traced and identified in specific property.”).
183
SMITH, supra note 43, at 10. According to Smith,
[t]he most salient difference between the exercise of tracing and the
exercise of following is that the latter can be exclusively factual.
Following can involve no more than the proof that a particular thing
was in a certain place at a certain time. Tracing, on the other hand,
always involves the application of legal rules.
Id. at 11.
184
See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 151, § 11(ii), at 53.
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Although they can be stand-alone processes, following and claiming
overlap with the tracing process. The first step is to follow the path of
the misappropriated value from the victim to the wrongdoer. At that
point, the paths diverge.185 On the one hand, continuing the exercise of
following would lead to an innocent third party and an attempt to restore
the original value back to the victim, i.e., specific restitution.186 On the
other hand, abandoning the exercise of following would lead to the
exercise of claiming that substituted value in the wrongdoer’s custody is
a legally unjustified benefit at the victim’s expense, i.e., unjust
enrichment.187 This latter step completes the tracing exercise, which thus
neither follows the misappropriated value to its ultimate resting point nor
claims that the substituted value justifiably belongs to the victim.188 All
that concerns tracing is recognizing substituted value.
C. Doctrinal Methods
The litmus test for any conception of remedial tracing is the problem
of commingled funds. As one commentator has observed, “[i]t was at
one time thought that once money had reached the hands of a banker or
broker, it was absolutely merged, not traceable, and so not recoverable,
whatever might be the claimant’s rights against the customer.”189 Unlike
the basic tracing scenario involving an exchange of value between a
wrongdoer and a third party, commingled funds introduce another
wrinkle. Commingling enables the wrongdoer to substitute fungible
value,190 or more cynically, to launder money.191
185

See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 8 (“Sometimes a plaintiff will want to conduct
both exercises, tracing and following. . . . Both exercises cannot . . . be conducted in
relation to the same transaction, except of course as alternatives, because they are
mutually inconsistent.”).
186
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
187
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
188
But see, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(3), at 11 (“The purpose of
constructive trust, equitable lien and even subrogation, is to require restitution to prevent
unjust enrichment.”).
189
MARK HAPGOOD, PAGET’S LAW OF BANKING 177 (10th ed. 1989). Indeed, many
civil law commentators maintain that
[t]he common law will not trace through a mixed fund. . . . In other
words, at common law, the question whether anything survives in
your hands becomes a question whether there is anything which you
hold as the result of one or more clean substitutions, without adding
outside funds to those originally received.
BIRKS, supra note 45, at 359. But see, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 162-74, 174
(challenging this view, as part of a broader conception of tracing that does not abide by
the distinction between equity and law, because “[t]he rules of tracing tell us when an
asset counts as the substitute for or proceeds of another asset”); see also supra notes 150154 and accompanying text.
190
See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 161-62 (“This situation has multiple inputs,
and multiple outputs as well. It is impossible definitively to ascribe the value being
traced to either of the outputs.”). The wrongdoer need not be entitled to the additional
source of value, as it may come from another illicit transaction.
191
See generally Stephen Moriarty, Tracing, Mixing and Laundering, in BIRKS,
supra note 150, at 73.
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Courts have devised a myriad of rules for tracing commingled funds.
The elementary case involves a bank account that contains a fixed
amount of the wrongdoer’s own value and the misappropriated value. In
this case the victim can claim the full amount of the traceable
misappropriated value,192 even if the wrongdoer deposits additional value
into the commingled fund.193
The intermediate case involves a commingled bank account from
which the wrongdoer has withdrawn value. The dominant approach is to
employ a pari passu rule.194 Courts award the victim a proportionate
interest in the wrongdoer’s bank account at the time it becomes
commingled with the misappropriated value. When the wrongdoer only
withdraws funds from the bank account, the victim maintains a claim to a
proportionate interest in the remaining traceable value.195 When,
however, the wrongdoer has withdrawn and also deposited value within
the bank account, courts use what is known as the Lowest Intermediate

192
See, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(4), at 16 (“In the simplest situation . . .
[t]he plaintiff is entitled to a lien on the commingled fund in the amount of his own
monies traced to it.”); HAPGOOD, supra note 189, at 178 (“[S]o long as money is
traceable either in specie or in its proceeds or investment, equity will follow and lay hold
of it, under what is known as a tracing order . . . .”). The wrongdoer bears the burden of
proving that certain commingled value does not belong to the victim; interestingly, this
permits a startling possibility in which the victim could claim all of the value in a
commingled fund when the wrongdoer fails to meet the applicable burden. See id. at §
6.1(4), at 16 n.3 (citing Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251
(1916); Republic Supply Co. of Calif. v. Richfield Oil Co. of Calif., 79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1935)). This would seem to be an impermissible extraction of the claiming process
within rules-based tracing. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. In any event, this
scenario is not possible under the Securities Act, which caps the amount recoverable by a
securityholder to the amount of the offering price and, in the case of section 11, the total
award to the aggregate offering yield. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
193
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 215, at 869 cmt. c
(“Although subsequent additions of cash from other sources increase the amount of the
fund on which the claimant has a lien, they do not increase the amount he is entitled to
receive from the fund.”). See also 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(4), at 16 n.2 (“If the
fund has grown by the deposit of unidentified funds, there seems no reason to give the
plaintiff a proportionate share of the fund.”). This is distinct from the situation where the
value within the commingled fund appreciates. See infra notes 199-200 and
accompanying text.
194
In re Diplock, 1 Ch. 465 (1948), is the first notable case in which courts applied
this rule. An alternate rule used within civil jurisdictions is known as “First In, First
Out,” which deems the source of the first deposit into an active commingled account as
the source of the first withdrawal. See, e.g., Clayton’s Case, 1 Mer. 572 (1816). Because
of the difficulty associated with proving the source of the first deposit, some courts
proceeded to deem the first withdrawal to be presumptively from the wrongdoer’s value,
regardless of the order of deposits. See, e.g., Hallet’s Case, 13 Ch.D. 696 (1879). But
see, e.g., GOFF & JONES, supra note 152, at 59.
195
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, §§ 211, 212. See also
BIRKS, supra note 45, at 363 (“[T]he fund which is held by the defendant is regarded at
the moment of the mixing as containing both the plaintiff’s money and his own and then
as depreciating in the same proportions as it was originally constituted.”). But see 1
GEORGE PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION §§ 2.16, 2.17 (1978) (questioning the mechanics
of pari passu when the withdrawals are untraceable).
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Balance rule;196 because there are multiple possible sources of value,197
the victim can claim only up to the lowest balance between the time of
the wrongdoer’s deposit and tracing.198
The difficult case involves a commingled bank account that has
appreciated in value. In this case the value may have increased through
any number of ways, such as investment or interest. Some contend that
the victim should be entitled to no more than the traceable
misappropriated value.199 Others instead advocate a pari passu approach,
whereby the victim is entitled to claim a proportionate interest in the
appreciated commingled value.200
None of these rules, however, represents a principled approach to
commingled funds as rules-based tracing does. According to Dan
Dobbs, “every one of the methods for tracing commingled funds can
present a problem on some set of facts.”201 The problem is that these
existing methods focus on assets or property in support of a legal claim.
In contrast rules-based tracing focuses on value and does not include the
analytically distinct exercise of claiming.202 Under this conception, “[a]
mixed substitution creates a mixture of value.”203 Rules-based tracing
merely seeks to determine whether commingled funds are a substitution,
and thus a mixture, of value; this process “does not entail that the
plaintiff has any rights in the traceable proceeds.”204 Commingling
perforce involves fungible instruments, typically money within a bank
account. This fungibility is the linchpin of any situation where
misappropriated value is substituted with value from the wrongdoer or
some other party. Certainly, fungibility does not entail substitution. But
whenever a wrongdoer commingles fungible instruments, they are either
the original value that is the object of following or substituted value that
196

See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612 (1st
Cir. 1988); Re Mahan & Rowsey Inc., 817 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Bacno Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986).
197
This includes not only value from the wrongdoer and the victim, but also from
another victim or an innocent third party. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 201 (“[I]t is
impossible to say whether or not [a deposit of value] cam from the plaintiff; the account
is an indistinguishable mixture of value; but this impossibility is resolved in her favour
[sic] against a wrongdoer.”).
198
See, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(4), at 22.
199
See, e.g., BIRKS, supra note 45, at 366 (citing dicta within Re Hallet’s Estate, 13
Ch.D. at 709, that “a fortiori that as against an innocent defendant the recipient can only
say that there survives, in the appreciated asset, the full value of the enrichment originally
received”). Birks rightfully notes, however, that this position “seems inconsistent with
the view expressed in relation to purchases from an unmixed fund,” where the victim is
entitled to all of the wrongdoer’s proceeds. Id.
200
See, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(4), at 16 n.2 (“[T]he plaintiff may have
a plausible claim not only for a lien to secure his losses, but for a share of the augmented
fund represented by the original ratio of his deposits to those of the defendant’s.”).
201
Id. at § 6.1(4), at 25.
202
See supra note 188 and accompanying text. This is particularly appropriate
within the securities context, where the justification for liability is based on the Securities
Act and not the tracing requirement. See infra Part III.A.
203
SMITH, supra note 43, at 165.
204
Id. at 166.
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is the object of tracing. Because portions of the following exercise are
part of tracing,205 commingled funds are safely deemed traceable. Rulesbased tracing, therefore, encounters no peculiar difficulties with
commingled funds.
INTRADISCIPLINARY TRACING
The previous Parts have navigated through the technical terrain of
securities and remedial law to map their respective conceptions of
tracing. Within each domain tracing has received particularized
criticism. Explicit comparison between these conceptions, however,
allows remedial law to reveal the most serious problem with securities
law’s conception of tracing: it is not actually tracing. Equally troubling,
it is not even a form of following. Securityholders must follow their
purchase back to a fraudulent offering, and yet never seek specific
restitution of these securities. Moreover, because of the book-entry
system, these securities are fungible, and thus substitutable, instruments
ill-suited to following.
Rules-based tracing can rehabilitate securities law’s tracing
requirement. The key is to abandon focus on the securities purchased,
and instead trace the value exchanged, that is, the money. This value is
substituted via the wrongdoer’s commingled bank account. And this
value is the benefit that a wrongdoer unjustifiably receives at the
securityholder’s expense. Rules-based tracing also comports with the
Securities Act in that the process directs securityholders to claim the
statutory provision of monetary relief.
Rules-based tracing handles multiple offerings with relative ease.
This is accomplished by a simple designation system in which
securityholders arbitrarily select an offering at the point of purchase. For
the purposes of asserting a claim, that selection will determine whether
the securityholders exchanged value in connection with a fraudulent
offering. Designating offerings in this way will restore access private
civil relief to all securityholders, and deter fraud optimally. Further, this
approach to tracing is not only compatible with the SEC’s “access equals
delivery” model, but can further its objectives.
This Part’s
intradisciplinary comparison thus yields a superior conceptual and
practical framework for rules-based tracing within securities law.
A. Re-Tracing
Remedial tracing has no true counterpart within securities law. The
latter’s conception of tracing filters access to private civil relief under the
Securities Act based on what “such security” a person has purchased.206
This factual inquiry examines a security only to determine the link

205
206

See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
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between a securityholder and a fraudulent offering.207 To “trace”
securities successfully means to conclude that an inferable relationship
exists between the fraud and the ultimate purchase.208
“Tracing” in securities law entails nothing more. Proof of the causal
link neither generates nor justifies any legal liability.209 The source of
liability are sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act,210 and the
justification comes from the Securities Act’s express purpose of adequate
disclosure and implicit purpose of deterrence.211 Proof of the causal link
does not even resolve the question of legal liability. This is true even
with respect to the strict liability provided under section 11 of the
Securities Act, which requires proof not only of the fraud but also of the
defendant’s direct role.212
Put differently, the remedial counterpart to this securities doctrine
would seem to be following. The “tracing” requirement is simply a
mechanical exercise in which courts reconstruct the path of a security
from a public offering, through a centralized custodian, to a broker or
dealer, and then into the hands of a purchaser.213 The security is but a
proxy for the flow of misstatements or omissions within a public
offering.214 Correspondingly, “tracing” here involves no real substitution
of the security.215 On the contrary, to “trace” successfully requires proof
that the security from the disputed public offering has not been
substituted in any way;216 that is, the purchaser must perform the
complete following exercise, which is “mutually inconsistent” with
tracing.217 Indeed, the only actual substitution involves the requested
relief; both sections 11 and 12(a)(2) do not award relief in the form of the

207

See, e.g., In re: Initial Public Offering Securities Litig., Nos. 21 MC 92, 01 Civ.
3857, 01 Civ. 8408, 01 Civ. 7048, 01 Civ. 9417, 01 Civ. 6001, 01 Civ. 0242, 2004 WL
2297401, at *38 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004) (“Tracing may be established . . . through
proof of a direct chain of title from the original offering to the ultimate owner . . . .”).
208
See supra Part I.C. This is entirely distinct from the presumption of reliance.
See supra notes 78, 82, and accompanying text.
209
Certainly, failure to establish the requisite causal link precludes access to private
civil remedies under the Securities Act. To understand tracing in this way, however, is to
commit the mistake of seeing the requirement as one of standing. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
210
See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
211
See supra notes 72-74, 85, and accompanying text.
212
See supra note 76.
213
See supra notes 110, 187-188, and accompanying text.
214
See supra Part I.C.
215
When there is only one public offering, there is still “substitution” of the security
in the limited sense that it is fungible with all other like securities via the book-entry
system. One, however, does not purchase a “specific” security in the aftermarket and
thus one cannot know even the original thing that is “substituted” through a clearing
corporation. Moreover, this notion of substitution is merely one of form, and not of
value, and thus not relevant for the purposes of tracing. See SMITH, supra note 43, at 15;
see also supra notes 174-181 and accompanying text.
216
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text; supra Part I.C.
217
See supra note 185.
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security, but rather its offering price.218 Courts, therefore, require
purchasers to “follow” securities, and yet “substitute” their claim.
Securities law instead should trace the value exchanged and then
substituted. The existing method curiously takes the vantage point of the
wrongdoer, and follows its direct connection to a security into the
purchaser’s hands.219 This inverts and distorts the proper orientation that
rules-based tracing takes, which is the value derived from
misappropriation.220 In the context of securities this value is the purchase
money. Rather than focusing on the wrongdoer, this inquiry begins with
the object of relief, the securityholder. One need go no further than the
Securities Act to see the primacy accorded to protecting the
securityholder, and thus why it should be the initial vantage point.221
And to the extent that courts follow anything, it should not be the
security, but the money. Beyond the fact that the statutory relief comes
in the form of money,222 this is the misappropriated value that following
should seek to locate and then restore.223
But following the securityholder’s misappropriated value neither
entails a substitution nor generates any liability. Rules-based tracing is a
process whereby courts determine whether certain substituted value
within the wrongdoer’s possession is derivative of the victim’s original
value, and thus is subject to a legal claim.224 The misappropriated value the securityholder’s money - almost invariably ends up commingled in
the wrongdoer’s bank account.225 In a semantic sense this money has
changed into equity for the defendant. In a more substantive sense the
original value has merged with other value, either from other innocent
parties or the wrongdoer, into a fungible mass available for separate

218

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77k(g), 77l(2) (2004). This is not to say that the
substitution in relief is improper. This, however, merely reinforces the fact that liability,
and thus claiming, exclusively come from the Securities Act and its rationales.
219
See supra notes 28-33, 127, and accompanying text.
220
See supra notes 174, 185-187, and accompanying text.
221
See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. This is compatible with a
deterrence rationale for sections 11 and 12(a)(2), pursuant to which ex post awards to
aggrieved securityholders are justified in their provision of ex ante protection to future
securityholders. See supra note 85. The wrongdoer is relevant only to the extent that the
relief provides incentives to prevent further claims by securityholders.
222
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77l(2) (2004).
223
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
224
See supra note 173 and accompanying text. Like following, however, rulesbased tracing does not generate liability, which is the subject of claiming. See, e.g.,
SMITH, supra note 43, at 132.
225
This could be any one of the many classes of defendants subject to section 11 or
12(a)(2) liability. Conceivably, such defendant might deposit the securityholder’s money
into a separate account that experiences no other deposits or withdrawals. This, however,
would devolve into a following exercise. If there are separate deposits or withdrawals,
the same tracing principle would apply. To the extent this does not comport literally with
rules-based tracing, courts likely would not exalt form over substance. See, e.g., Barnes’
Lessee v. Irwin, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 199, 203 (1793) (“The substance, and not the form,
ought principally to be regarded.”).
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transactions; this commingling perforce interchanges value, and thus
involves a substitution that can only be traced.226
And focusing on the substituted value supplies the particular form of
relief provided by the Securities Act. Misappropriating original value
constitutes an unjustified benefit that a section 11 or 12(a)(2) defendant
obtains at the securityholder’s expense; this is a paradigmatic case of
unjust enrichment.227 Indeed, this is what sections 11 and 12(a)(2)
contemplate by providing claims “either at law or in equity.”228 Further,
the substituted value is the specific object of the securityholder’s claim.
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) both award monetary relief based on,
respectively, the “amount paid for the security,”229 and the “consideration
paid for such security,”230 without requiring that this be the purchaser’s
actual misappropriated value.
Rules-based tracing of money represents a principled and justified
way to restore access to private civil relief under the Securities Act. The
first step is to establish the transfer of the securityholder’s money to the
defendant, as evidenced by a confirmation of sale or some other form of
receipt. The next step is to establish the merger or conversion of the
securityholder’s money by the defendant with other value, as inferred
from a deposit into a bank account containing value from either the
wrongdoer or another party.231 Upon completing these steps, the
securityholder can seek to invoke unjust enrichment as a basis for a claim
under sections 11 or 12(a)(2).
None of this guarantees that a securityholder will obtain relief.
Beyond the admittedly lax requirements of the first two steps, a
securityholder must satisfy the elements of unjust enrichment to have
avail to a claim. A court, therefore, must determine that there has been
no breach of an independent duty and that the benefit to the defendant
clearly exceeds the losses to the securityholder.232 Moreover, completing
the rules-based tracing exercise only entitles a securityholder access to
private civil relief. A securityholder still must establish a prima facie
case under section 11 or 12(a)(2). For section 11 this involves proof of
the defendant’s direct role in an offering and its fraudulent character.233
For section 12(a)(2), in addition to the section 11 elements, there must be
privity.234 Moreover, defendants certainly have an array of defenses.235
226
Accordingly, even if one wanted to follow the original value, completing the
exercise would be virtually impossible whenever a commingled bank account is involved.
227
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
228
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(2) (2004).
229
Section 11 provides a formula for deducting from this “amount paid,” with a cap
based on the offering price. See supra note 79. Notably, one of the deductions involves
“the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought.” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (emphasis
added).
230
Id. at § 77l(2).
231
Additional value from the securityholder would require only a following
exercise. See supra note 225.
232
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 1.
233
See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
234
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
235
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b), 77l(2).
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B. Tracing Multiple Offerings
Rules-based tracing of securities provides a significant benefit,
however, that the existing requirement cannot. The existence of the
book-entry system and its centralized custodial structure effectively
necessitates discrimination between various classes of securityholders.236
Regardless of the method used, only Class I securityholders have any
assurance of claiming private civil relief under the Securities Act.237
Through inferential reasoning, this assurance extends to Class II, and
arguably some Class III, securityholders when there is only one
offering.238 This assurance evaporates, however, when there are multiple
offerings; at best Class II securityholders have uncertain access to
sections 11 and 12(a)(2), and at worst Class III securityholders have no
access whatsoever.239 As a result, there is a considerable incentive to
conduct multiple offerings to avoid substantial liability under the
Securities Act.
The way to combat this incentive is resort to intradisciplinary
tracing. One possibility is the Fungible Mass method derived from the
toxic tort context.240 The method originated as a way to deal with the
problem of indeterminate plaintiffs that cannot pinpoint the source of
their injury.241 To solve this problem, courts have permitted the use of
statistical evidence to establish that exposure to a particular substance
was more probably the specific cause of the injury than other background
factors.242 Adapted to the securities context, courts would apply a
preponderance of the evidence standard to all securityholders.243
Provided there is a greater than fifty percent probability that a given
purchase was from an offering involving material misstatements or
omissions,244 the total number of offerings involved would be irrelevant,
and any securityholder could satisfy the existing tracing requirement.245
236

See supra Parts I.B-C.
See supra notes 31-32, 121, and accompanying text.
238
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
239
See supra Part I. C.
240
See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
241
See Sale, supra note 19, at 486 & n.361 (analyzing causation issues within In re
“Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 833-35 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
and noting that the problem also plagues insider trading claims within securities law).
242
See Sale, supra note 19, at 486-87 (“Many . . . courts have considered this
problem in various toxic-substance contexts and have permitted proof of causation
through statistically based evidence.”) (citing cases).
243
See, e.g., Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1378-79 (D. Minn. 1984),
aff’d, 760 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision).
244
Cf. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358
(photo. reprint 1978) (9th ed. 1783) (quantifying reasonable doubt as tolerating a 10%
error rate). This implicates voluminous evidentiary literature concerning proof paradoxes
and Bayesian formulations that cannot be addressed reasonably here. See generally L.
JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) (Proof Paradoxes); Richard
O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977) (Bayesian
Formulation). But see, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in
Criminal Cases: Some Doubt about Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 126 (1999)
237
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Hillary Sale has argued forcefully in favor of using this method
instead of the prevailing Direct Tracing approach.246 The Fungible Mass
method now enjoys sufficient currency within torts law that allays early
judicial apprehension within securities law.247 Further, the method
comports not only with sections 11 and 12(a)(2),248 but also the Securities
Act’s express purpose.249 And, perhaps most significantly, the method
provides Class II and III securityholders more assured access to private
civil relief.250
This access, however, would not always be available. The Fungible
Mass method requires statistical proof that a majority of the shares are
from a fraudulent offering. The method’s flip-side, then, is that
securityholders would have no access to relief when a majority of the
shares are from a non-fraudulent offering.251 Accordingly, the method
still generates a perverse incentive. Section 11 and 12(a)(2) defendants
can use a non-fraudulent offering to eliminate or undo their liability for a
previous fraudulent offering.252 Alternatively, one could preempt any
risk of liability by splitting an originally planned offering into two
offerings of equal amounts of securities, only one of which involves
fraud. The Fungible Mass method thus provides a solution to the tracing
requirement, but suffers from the same current evasion strategy.
Rules-based tracing can eliminate this problem. All that would be
necessary with multiple offerings is to give securityholders a choice. At
the point of purchase a securityholder would designate an offering to be
connected with the value provided. That designation would be recorded
(“Our courts do not use jury instructions based on percentages of certainty, and I do not
suggest here that they begin doing so.”).
245
See Sale, supra note 19, at 488 (“[R]egardless of when they bought their shares,
all of the shareholders would be Offering Shareholders and should have access to
remedies of sections 11 and 12(a)(2).”).
246
See id. at 483-93.
247
See id. at 485 (“[A]cceptance of [statistically derived-proof] has gained
ascendancy in all types of civil litigation and can be used for proof of traceability here.”).
This development directly addresses a reason cited by a court that considered, and then
rejected, the Fungible Mass method. See In re Elscint, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374,
381 (D. Mass 1987). Sale’s proposal thus builds upon a method that courts already have
recognized within the securities context. I see no reason, however, why courts should be
any more reluctant to embrace another intradisciplinary method that enjoys currency
within the remedial context and is actually a theoretically correct conception of tracing.
248
See Sale, supra note 19, at 489-93 (establishing the method’s compatibility with
various restrictive aspects of both provisions, such as the one-year statute of limitations,
liability caps, and strike suit guards).
249
See id. at 493 (“[T]he use of statistics . . . would help to force defendants to take
seriously their due-diligence responsibilities to deter misstatements and omissions-the
reason Congress created such stringent provisions in sections 11 and 12(a)(2) in the first
place.”).
250
See id. at 488 (“ [S]tatistically derived proof solves the problem of shareholders
who purchase Offering Shares in the Aftermarket and are, therefore, unable to meet the
direct tracing requirement.”).
251
See id. at 489 (“[A]ny time the percentage of later Offering Shares exceeds those
in the earlier, disputed offering, the plaintiffs will not succeed with their statistically
based evidence.”).
252
See, e.g., supra note 36.
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by the central depository or issuer, contemporaneous with the purchase.
The total number of designations possible would be tied to the number of
securities offered. Akin to the rule courts currently apply,253 designations
would operate on a “First-Come, First-In” basis; once all securities in a
particular offering are designated, that option would disappear and the
process would continue until all such designations of offerings were
complete.254 Securityholders would be permitted only to trace, and then
claim, value for designated offerings.
Designations would present no logistical problems. The electronic
system currently in place for clearing and settling trades easily could
handle recordation of designations. Further, this task would be only a
slight imposition for brokers or dealers that already must handle
transactions. Accordingly, the systemic and transaction costs of
implementing this right-based tracing system would be minimal. At the
same time, the designations would provide clear evidence, and thus
conserve judicial resources that the existing tracing inquiry does, or the
Fungible Mass method would, expend.255
Further, designations would present no legal difficulties. The fact
that securityholders necessarily must choose an offering without
knowing ex ante which designation will lead to a claim is entirely
consistent with sections 11 and 12(a)(2)’s bar on securityholders
purchasing while knowing of fraud.256 And because the number of
designations and securities offered are linked, the cap on damages to
offering price would ensure that the maximum aggregate liability would
comply with the statutory limit.257
Moreover, the limit on designations effectively addresses any policy
concerns about the accuracy of relief. On the one hand the class of
claimants may be overinclusive.
Certainly there will be some
securityholders that will choose an offering actually unconnected with
the exchanged value;258 and some securityholders will be able to make a
claim even though they exchanged value in connection with a nonfraudulent offering.259 On the other hand the class of claimants may be
underinclusive. There will be other securityholders that will not be able
to choose the offering actually connected with their exchanged value;
253

See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
As with other methods, this designation scheme would be unnecessary when
there is only one offering, as all those securities are already traceable. See supra note
130.
255
Cf. Linda J. Candler, Tracing and Recovering Proceeds of Criminal Fraud
Cases: A Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Legislation, 31 INT’L LAW. 3, 4 (1997) (In
numerous cases “tracing the assets and recovering the proceeds of the fraud have proved
to be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.”)
256
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(2) (2004).
257
See id. at §§ 77k(e), 77l(2).
258
Courts historically have viewed this concern as one of legal causation. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967). As demonstrated earlier, such a view is
premised on a conception of tracing that is actually following. See supra notes 213-218
and accompanying text. Rules-based tracing, however, is not concerned with the
connection between misappropriated value and a fraudulent offering. See supra notes
219-223 and accompanying text.
259
See Sale, supra note 19, at 489-91.
254
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and some securityholders will not be able to make a claim even though
they exchanged value in connection with a fraudulent offering.260
While there is no guarantee that these different groups will be
symmetrical, and thus offset each other,261 the amount of relief certainly
will be accurate. From the standpoint of a section 11 or 12(a)(2)
defendant the limit on the number of designations ensures that the
liability will not exceed the capped offering price.262 To the extent that
sections 11 and 12(a)(2) seek to deter, rather than compensate,263 these
designations would achieve a superior result than any of the existing
methods.264 Indeed, these designations theoretically should produce the
optimal amount of desired deterrence contemplated by statute.
At the same time, the designations employ an egalitarian approach to
all classes of securityholders. Unlike existing approaches that follow
securities, the designation system is based on the value exchanged. This
is manifest in how securityholders would select an offering at the time of
purchase, which is when an exchange of value occurs. Class I
securityholders effectively will experience no difference under this
scheme, as they will have the first opportunity to make a designation.
And unless Class I securityholders purchase the entire offering, Class II
and III securityholders also will have an opportunity to make a
designation. This is because the capacity to designate, and thus seek a
claim, would turn on not a securityholder’s access, but the relationship
between the value exchanged and the number of securities offered.265
Rules-based tracing thus eschews the need to make “arbitrary
260

Securityholders can avoid this result by simply purchasing at least two shares and
hedging their designations on different offerings. A modest consequence of such rational
hedging might be that shares from different offerings will trade at different prices,
particularly in response to one offering being barred by the statute of limitations and in
situations where the company has a less than pristine reputation. A more cynical
consequence might be the emergence of a secondary post-purchase market in which
securityholders trade their designations about which offerings might involve material
misstatements or omissions. I thank Tung Yin for raising these points.
Both possible consequences present the same basic problem of variances between
different designated shares, either for the same company or between separate companies.
As a preliminary matter, these variances can be accounted for and justified by the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis. See supra note __. Moreover, the market would
be limited by the one-year statute of limitations running from the post-effective date.
And, in any event, these secondary claims likely would not generate any additional
liability; because the designation scheme eliminates any uncertainty in claiming, any
securityholder that had designated a fraudulent offering likely would assert a claim.
Finally, as the aggregate recovery cap limits the number of permissible claims, courts
simply could look at the records for securityholders that had made initial designations
and prefer their claims.
261
But cf. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 1 cmt. d (“Ordinarily the
benefit to the one and the loss to the other are co-extensive, and the result . . . [will be] to
make restitution to the other for the loss which he has suffered.”).
262
See id. at §§ 77k(e), 77l(2).
263
See supra 85.
264
As Sale has noted, “[t]he most important argument . . . is that without a new way
to prove tracing, the mechanism to enforce the recovery rights of [Class II and III
securityholders] is eliminated.” Sale, supra note 19, at 491.
265
See supra note 253.
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distinctions” between securityholders.266
Instead, the market for
purchasing securities would govern the capacity to seek private civil
relief under the Securities Act.
C. Value Equals Access Equals Delivery
The SEC’s “access equals delivery” model is remarkably compatible
with the rules-based tracing scheme proposed here. The model strives to
streamline the procedures for effecting delivery of a final prospectus
without compromising investor confidence about their participation in a
registered offering.267 The additional notification provision cuts against
this objective. The provision effectively requires delivery of a notice by
a “well-known seasoned issuer” in lieu of the final prospectus delivery
requirement that the model seeks to relax.
To be sure, this notification requirement is necessary to protect
investors. Notice performs a valuable function in confirming that a
purchase was part of a registered transaction. This reassures investors of
their access to certain private civil remedies in the event that the offering
turns out to be fraudulent.268 Whether deliberate or not, however, the
SEC no longer explicitly bases the need for notice on “an investor’s
ability to trace securities.”269 Certainly this ability has deteriorated at the
hands of the book-entry system and judicial formulations of the “tracing”
requirement.270 As a result, while delivery of a final prospectus can be
effected through online access, securityholders no longer have reliable
access to private civil remedies under the Securities Act.
Rules-based tracing would obviate the need for a notification
requirement. Tellingly, the notification requirement does not revolve
around the path of the security, but rather the transactional status of the
purchase, that is, the exchange of value.271 Similarly, designating an
offering at the point of purchase enables securityholders to later trace the
exchange, and subsequent substitution, of misappropriated value. This
scheme thus would reassure all initial participants in a “well-known
seasoned issuer’s” offering that they will be capable of seeking relief
through sections 11 or 12(a)(2).272 Such reassurance is what the
notification requirement presumably seeks to provide.
266
In re: Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., Nos. 21 MC 92, 01 Civ. 3857, 01 Civ.
8408, 01 Civ. 7048, 01 Civ. 9417, 01 Civ. 6001, 01 Civ. 0242, 2004 WL 2297401, at *37
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004).
267
See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
268
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
269
See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
270
See supra Parts II.B-C.
Under the “access equals delivery” model
securityholders still would receive a confirmation of sale and subsequently could request
a copy of the final prospectus. See Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. at 67439.
Because issuers eligible for the “access equals delivery” model must be relatively
established and reliable, see id., there is a limited need for reassurance that rules-based
tracing can satisfy. For other issuers rules-based tracing would not supplant existing final
prospectus and notification requirements.
271
See supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text.
272
See supra notes 254-264 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Tracing is a method that appears within multiple fields of law.
Courts frequently trace in agency,273 antitrust,274 bankruptcy,275
commercial,276 contract,277 criminal,278 elderly,279 family,280 property,281
tax,282 and tort283 matters. These applications are matched perhaps only
273
See, e.g., MARK HAPGOOD, PAGET’S LAW OF BANKING 372 (11th ed. 1996) (“A
fundamental condition for property to be traced in equity is the existence of an equitable
relationship.”). But cf. supra note 152.
274
See, e.g., Amy A. Marasco, Note, Tracing an Antitrust Injury in Secondary Line
Price Discrimination Cases, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 926-27 (1982) (“[C]ourts have
taken a stricter approach to the concept of tracing and have allowed damages only when
it has been clear that the injury did not result from any form of legitimate competition or
the plaintiff’s own inadequacies.”).
275
See, e.g., Steve H. Nickels & Edward S. Adams, Tracing Proceeds to Attorneys’
Pockets (and the Dilemma of Paying for Bankruptcy), 78 MINN. L. REV. 1079, 1104-05
(1994) (“When the debtor commingles proceeds with non-proceeds, courts employ a
fictional tracing method known as the lowest intermediate balance rule, derived from the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts.”).
276
See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, Tracing Commingled Proceeds:
The
Metamorphosis of Equity Principles into U.C.C. Doctrine, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 282
(1990) (“In creating [a] principle of attribution, the drafters of [U.C.C.] section 9-306 . . .
borrowed tracing rules from the laws of trusts, equity and restitution and infused Article
Nine with them.”).
277
See, e.g., Matthews v. Crowder, 69 S.W. 779, 780 (Tenn. 1902) (“[T]he
supplementary subjection . . . results from . . . the doctrine that a cestui que trust may
follow the trust fund wherever he may be able to trace it, except in the hands of innocent
third persons.”).
278
See, e.g., Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133, 136 (N.Y. 1877) (“[T]he owner of
negotiable securities stolen and afterwards sold by the thief may pursue the proceeds of
the sale in the hands of the felonious taker or his assignee with notice, through whatever
changes the proceeds may have gone, so long as the proceeds or the substitute therefor
[sic] can be distinguished and identified . . . .”).
279
See, e.g., Janel C. Frank, Note, How Far Is Too Far? Tracing Assets in Medicaid
Estate Recovery, 79 N.D. L. REV. 111, 144 (2003) (“Most states have interpreted [the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act] as allowing them to trace and recover assets that
were once owned by the recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse.”).
280
See, e.g., J. Thomas Oldman, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23
FAM. L.Q. 219, 223-24 (1989) (“[T]o establish a separate property claim to funds in
existence at the time of divorce, a spouse must be able to trace such funds to separate
property.”).
281
See, e.g., ANDREW P. BELL, MODERN LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IN ENGLAND
AND IRELAND 462 (1989) (“The law of tracing embraces . . . rules relating to the situation
where the subject-matter of an interest has been disposed of or undergone some change of
form or mixing with other property.”).
282
See, e.g., Alfred D. Youngwood & Christina M. Cerrito, Tracing Property After
Its “Owner” Changes: Sections 337, 704(c)(1), 737, 751, 382, 384, 1031, and 1374, 51
TAX LAW. 511, 512 (1998) (“Congress has chosen to track the property movements in
certain of these business arrangements . . . to prevent income or basis shifting among
parties who might have the incentives and ability to do so.”).
283
See, e.g., James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, Or, Where There’s a Remedy,
There’s a Right: A Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYR. L. REV. 215, 245 n.230 (2004)
(“Nineteenth century equity courts developed presumptions that permitted tracing of
monies that had been illegally deposited in the tortfeasor’s bank account and commingled
with other funds.”) (citing cases).
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by the multiplicity of names tracing has assumed over the years.284 More
significantly, an absence of dialogue between legal domains has spawned
different conceptions of tracing within securities and remedial law that
engender radically divergent results. In securities law tracing deprives
securityholders of private civil relief, whereas in remedial law, tracing
provides restitutionary relief to victims deprived of their value.
Undoubtedly, these inverted conceptions of tracing are the product of
unconscious accident, and not premeditated design. As one commentator
has observed,
Were symmetrical categories and doctrines joined,
courts would have no trouble spotting their intraconnection; it is only when the Siamese-doctrines are
severed that they may wander off in different
directions.285
The principal difficulty, however, lies not in spotting these “intraconnections,” but rather in convincing the law to use them. Centuries of
remedial tracing jurisprudence stand ready for courts to reconsider the
securities tracing requirement. All courts need to do is acknowledge the
value of money.

284
285

See supra notes 165-169 and accompanying text.
Hirsch, supra 66, at 1154.

